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ARTICLE

Parochial Procedure
Maggie Gardner,
Abstract. The federal courts are often accused of being too parochial, favoring U.S. parties
over foreigners and U.S. law over relevant foreign or international law. According to what
this Article terms the "parochial critique," the courts' U.S.-centrism generates unnecessary
friction with allies, regulatory conflict, and access-to-justice gaps. This parochialism is
assumed to reflect the preferences of individual judges: persuade judges to like
international law and transnational cases better, the standard story goes, and the courts
will reach more cosmopolitan results.
This Article challenges that assumption. I argue instead that parochial doctrines can
develop even in the absence of parochial judges. Our sometimes-parochial procedure may
be the unintended result of decisionmaking pressures that mount over time within poorly
designed doctrines. As such, it reflects not so much the personal views of individual judges
but the limits of institutional capacity, the realities of behavioral decisionmaking, and the
path dependence of the common law. This Article shows how open-ended decisionmaking
in the midst of complexity encourages the use of heuristics that tend to emphasize the
local, the familiar, and the concrete. These decisionmaking shortcuts, by disfavoring the
foreign, put a parochial thumb on the scale-but that tilt is not limited to individual cases.
Rather, it is locked in and amplified through the accumulation of precedent, as later judges
rely on existing decisions to resolve new cases. Over time, even judges with positive
conceptions of international law and transnational order will find themselves, in applying
these doctrines, consistently favoring U.S. litigants over foreigners and U.S. law over
foreign or international law.
To explore this theory, this Article traces the evolution of four procedural doctrines:
discovery of foreign evidence, forum non convemens, service of process abroad, and the
Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School. For valuable comments and
suggestions, I thank Oren Bar-Gill, Gabriella Blum, Stephen Burbank, Sergio Campos,
John Coyle, Dan Epps, Erica Goldberg, Jack Goldsmith, Martha Minow, Joe Singer,
Susannah Barton Tobin, Adrian Vermeule, Tobias Barrington Wolff, and Andrew
Woods. For engaging discussions during workshops, I am grateful to the participants at
the inaugural Civil Procedure Workshop at Seattle University; the Junior Federal Courts
Workshop at the University of California, Irvine; the Junior International Law Scholars
Association Annual Meeting at the University of Miami; and the Climenko Workshop at
Harvard Law School, as well as the faculty of William & Mary Law School. Tarek Austin,
Amanda Claire Grayson, and Rebecca Schindel provided truly exceptional research
assistance. All remaining errors are mine alone.
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recognition of foreign judgments. The decisionmaking pressures outlined here can explain
why the first two doctrines (framed as open-ended standards) are often criticized as
parochial while the latter two (framed in more rule-like terms) are not. And if that account
is at least plausible, it supports the primary claim of this Article: the occasional
parochialism of our courts does not necessarily reflect the personal prejudices of our
judges. If so, then avoiding the costs of parochialism will require structural, not just
personal, solutions.
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Introduction
When it comes to transnational litigation, are the federal courts isolationist or imperialist? Some scholars worry that U.S. courts are shirking cases that
involve foreign litigants, foreign laws, or foreign harms.' Others worry that
the courts are ignoring foreign sovereign interests in the cases they do take,
whether by compelling broad extraterritorial discovery, declining to apply
foreign or international law, or attempting to block foreign proceedings. 2
Though drawn from different debates, these perspectives have in common a
concern that the federal courts' procedural decisions are problematically biased
in favor of U.S. parties and U.S. law. According to what I call the "parochial
critique," this bias has provoked retaliation by foreign courts and legislatures,
strained foreign relations, created access-to-justice gaps, and increased
regulatory conflict. 3

Assuming the parochial critique is correct, 4 determining whether and how
to fix parochial procedure requires understanding where it comes from. The
standard explanation, whether explicit or implied, has been that we have
parochial procedure because we have parochial judges-judges who are
dismissive of foreigners and hostile to international or foreign law.5 The battle,
1. See, e.g., Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REv. 1081, 1088-89
(2015); Donald Earl Childress III, Rethinking Legal Globalization The Case of Transnational PersonalJurisdiction, 54 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1489, 1493-94 (2013); John F. Coyle, The
Casefor Writing InternationalLaw into the U.S. Code, 56 B.C. L. REv. 433, 434-35 (2015);
Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law: The Impact of Applying
Foreign Law in Transnational Tort Actions, 51 WAYNE L. REv. 1161, 1189, 1192 (2005);
Elizabeth T. Lear, NationalInterests, Foreign Injuries, and Federal Forum Non Conveniens,
41 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 559, 600-01 (2007); Patrick M. McFadden, Provincialism in United
States Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 4, 8-11 (1995); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REv. 1081, 1084 (2010); Matthew J.
Wilson, Demystifying the Determinationof Foreign Law in U.S. Courts' Opening the Door to
a GreaterGlobal Understanding,46 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 887, 890-91 (2011).
2. See, e.g., George A. Bermann, The Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in InternationalLitigation, 28
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 589, 630-31 (1990); Hannah L. Buxbaum, Assessing Sovereign
Interests in Cross-Border Discovery Disputes Lessons from A6rospatiale, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J.
87, 93-98 (2003); Coyle, supra note 1, at 434, 442-46; Paul R. Dubinsky, Is Transnational
Litigationa Distinct Fieldi The Persistenceof Exceptionalism in American ProceduralLaw, 44
STAN. J. INT'L L. 301, 308 (2008); McFadden, supra note 1, at 14-15; Jenia lontcheva, Case
Note, Sovereignty on Our Terms, 110 YALE L.J. 885, 888-92 (2001).
3. See infra Part II.
4. Evaluating the empirical claims of the critique is beyond the scope of this Article.
5. See, e.g., Childress, supra note 1, at 1507 (noting that "the courts' treatment of
transnational cases is incredibly parochial," with courts either "resisting adjudicating
such cases" or else "using a domestic frame of reference" to do so); Heiser, supra note 1,
at 1189 ("Unfortunately, most courts in the United States currently have a parochial,
not a global, perspective when it comes to hearing transnational tort actions.... Judges
often express discomfort with the prospects of ascertaining and applying foreign law
footnote continued on next page
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then, is for the hearts and minds of U.S. judges. To fix the courts' parochialism,
the literature suggests, we must convince individual judges of the value of
international law and a smoothly functioning system for resolving
transnational disputes.6
That standard account is not entirely satisfying. Most notably, it does not
7
explain the courts' selective parochialism. If judges were the direct source of
parochialism, one would expect to see uniformly parochial procedure. But in
some areas, like the recognition of foreign judgments, the federal courts are
decidedly cosmopolitan.8 The mistake in the standard account lies in assuming
that the whole (outcomes in the aggregate) reflects its component parts (the
views of individual judges). Rather, it is possible for an entire system, like the
federal courts, to exhibit an orientation that differs from the preferences of its
individual members.9
This Article explores whether the practice of the courts can be parochial
even if individual judges are not. I argue that parochial procedure can result
from the accumulation of decisions by trial judges who hold neutral (or even
cosmopolitan) views of the transnational order but who operate within wellrecognized institutional and behavioral constraints. Given those constraints,
reliance on open-ended standards to address complex questions beyond the ken
and are far more concerned about docket control than with some vaguely stated duty
to retain jurisdiction based on global responsibilities." (footnotes omitted)); Lear, supra
note 1, at 603 ("[Florum non conveniens decisions appear to depend more on the
individual biases of district court judges than any identifiable legal standard.");
McFadden, supra note 1, at 6-7 (setting out to demonstrate "the depth and breadth of
judicial animosity toward international law" and worrying that "[j]udicial provincialism inevitably migrates from the bench to the bar, and ultimately to the citizens and
residents of the United States"); Jonathan I. Charney, Book Review, 91 AM. J. INT'L L.
394, 394-95 (1997) (noting U.S. courts' "increasingly isolationist, if not nihilistic,
approach to the relevance of international law to U.S. law," which stems from "the
negative attitude of U.S. lawyers, especially the judiciary, toward . . . international
law"); see also Dubinsky, supra note 2, at 348 (concluding that "it is still unclear" whether
the federal judiciary is receptive to the development of transnational procedure).
6. See infranotes 79-81 and accompanying text.
7. I thank Tara Grove for this turn of phrase.
8. U.S. courts may be more willing to recognize and enforce foreign money judgments
than the courts of any other country. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional
Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 89, 89 (1999); Linda J. Silberman, The
Impact ofJurisdictionalRules and Recognition Practiceon InternationalBusiness TransactionsK

The US. Regime, 26 Hous.

J. INT'L L.

327, 351-52 (2004); Paul B. Stephan, Unjust Legal

Systems and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, in FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS AND
THE UNITED STATES LEGAL SYSTEM 84, 94 (Paul B. Stephan ed., 2014). For further
discussion, see Part IV.D below.
9. See Adrian Vermeule, Foreword:System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 68, 8 n.6 (2009) (describing both fallacies of division, where what is true of the aggregate
is assumed to be true of its individual members, and fallacies of composition, where
what is true of members is assumed to be true of the whole).
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of ordinary judges will encourage the use of heuristics. Those shortcuts will in
turn become amplified and ossified as precedents mount, creating path
dependence toward consistently parochial outcomes.
In broad strokes, this Article's alternative account goes like this: transnational cases-meaning cases involving parties foreign to the forum-are
complex. They typically require judges to deal with unfamiliar law, whether
international or foreign; to account for dynamic effects and multiple layers of
competing state interests; and to find foreign facts. Yet judges have limited
time and resources, and humans cannot process boundless complexity. Given
what we know about bounded rationality,' 0 institutional capacity,"1 and the
tradeoffs between rules and standards,1 2 it is predictable that in this complex
context, open-ended discretion will promote parochial outcomes over timenot because discretion allows judges to exercise their parochial priors but
because it enables the evolution of tests that increasingly lock in parochial
results. 13
To demonstrate the plausibility of this alternative account, this Article
contrasts district court practice in four areas of transnational procedure. In two
of these areas-the use of the Hague Evidence Convention 1 4 and motions to
dismiss for forum non conveniens-federal courts have often been criticized
for undervaluing foreign interests. 15 Courts almost never require parties to use
the Evidence Convention to resolve transnational discovery disputes,' 6 and
10. For other applications of behavioral psychology to judicial decisionmaking, see
Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way
Everybody Else Does-Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY
LJ. 83 (2002); Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CAuF. L. REV. 1581 (2006); and Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad

Law?, 73 U. CHL. L. REV. 883 (2006).
11. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretationand Institutions, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 885 (2003) (discussing statutory interpretation in light of institutional capacity
concerns).
12. For the canonical literature on which this discussion draws, see, for example,
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULEBASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards-An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE LJ. 557 (1992); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral
Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000); and
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword- The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22

(1992).
13. See infra Part Ill.
14. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
opened for signatureMar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Hague
Evidence Convention].
15. See sources cited infra notes 163, 219 (discussing the Evidence Convention and forum
non conveniens, respectively).
16. See infra Part IVA.
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they are more likely to dismiss a case for forum non conveniens if the case
involves a foreign plaintiff.17 In the other two areas-service of process on
8
defendants located abroad under the Hague Service Convention' and the
9
recognition of foreign judgmentsl -courts have escaped such criticism.
Indeed, federal courts consistently require plaintiffs to comply with the Service
Convention, 20 and they are perhaps more willing than the courts of any other
2
country to recognize and enforce foreign judgments. 1
This Article proposes that the difference in outcomes between these two
sets of doctrines reflects their initial structure. The open-ended discretion of
the first two doctrines encourages the development of tests that lock in
parochial outcomes, thus undermining the very values that the initial
22
standards sought (or at least proclaimed) to protect. The more structured
inquiries for judgment recognition and service of process, on the other hand,
may have helped to avoid the introduction of heuristics-or at least kept those
shortcuts from taking root.
Why these four doctrines? First, the liberality of U.S. courts' recognition of
foreign judgments is the hard case for the parochial critique's standard
explanation: If the problem is parochial judges, how do we explain the courts'
consistent willingness to recognize and enforce the judgments of other
countries? 23 Second, forum non conveniens and the Evidence Convention are
among the few doctrines where questions of international comity have been
17. See Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
481, 524-27 (2011).
18. Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in
Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361,
658 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Hague Service Convention].
19. The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are distinct judicial actions,
though the terms are sometimes used interchangeably. Here the focus will be on the
recognition of foreign judgments as the preliminary and more procedural step in
judgment enforcement.
20. See infraPart IV.C.
21. See sources cited supranote 8.
22. That is, although these two doctrines are said to promote international comity, see
William S. Dodge, InternationalComity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 210910, 2115-16 (2015) (discussing both as comity doctrines), the parochial tilt that has

developed over time may be undermining comity instead.

23. Stephen Burbank has argued that this difference in outcomes is due more simply to the
variation in domestic doctrines. See Stephen B. Burbank, jurisdictionalEquilibration, the
Proposed Hague Convention and Progress in National Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 203, 209
(2001). For example, "the generous treatment accorded internationally foreign
judgments in United States practice" reflects the domestic culture of liberal judgment

recognition under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Id. That explanation complements
the broader, systemic account developed here, which generalizes the effects of

transplanting domestic tests into the transnational context in light of individual and
institutional constraints.
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phrased as broad balancing tests rather than as more rule-like presumptions. 24
Finally, little attention has been paid to district court application of the
Evidence Convention and the Service Convention, so a close study of these
doctrines may provide new insights into the practice of transnational litigation
in U.S. courts. 25 Ultimately, however, this Article aims to use these examples
not to prove causation but rather to problematize it. For if this account of
parochialism-by-aggregation is at least plausible, it supports the primary claim
of this Article: winning over judges may not be enough to prevent parochial
procedure.
This Article starts in Part I by describing the system of private international law and the role of comity and reciprocity within it. It is this comity and
reciprocity that the courts' procedural parochialism is said to undermine.
Part II identifies the parochial critique as a unifying theme in the literature on
transnational litigation in U.S. courts but questions the critique's incomplete
causal story. Part III sets out the primary theoretical contribution of this
Article: how the interaction between judicial constraints and the complex
context of transnational litigation can encourage the evolution of parochial
doctrines. Part IV maps the theoretical argument onto district courts'
experience with four doctrines of transnational procedure. Part V moves from
the descriptive to the prescriptive, generalizing from the doctrinal examples to
identify decisionmaking structures that may prevent, or at least minimize,
aggregated parochialism. The solution is not to remove all judicial discretion,
as discretion allows judges to be sensitive in individual cases to fairness,

24. See Dodge, supra note 22, at 2130.
25. For particularly helpful discussions of the Evidence Convention in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in SocieteNationaleIndustrielle Airospatiale v. U.S. District Court,
482 U.S. 522 (1987), see, for example, Gary B. Born & Scott Hoing, Comity and the Lower
Courts: Post-ArospatialeApplications of the Hague Evidence Convention, 24 INTL LAW. 393
(1990); Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1987); Buxbaum, supra note 2; and Steven B. Burbank, The World in
Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1456, 1490-97 (1991) (book review). Commentary on the
Service Convention has tended to focus on the circuit split over whether the Convention allows service by mail or e-mail. See, e.g., Michael 0. Eshleman & Stephen A.
Wolaver, Prego Signor Postino: Using the Mail to Avoid the Hague Service Convention's
Central Authorities, 12 OR. REV. INfL L. 283, 319-21 (2010); David P. Stewart & Anna
Conley, E-Mail Service on ForeignDefendants: Time for an InternationalApproach?, 38 GEO.
J. INT'L L. 755, 757-58 (2007); Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Service by Mail-Is the Stamp of Approval
from the Hague Convention Always Enough?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1994, at
165, 167-68; Samuel R. Feldman, Note, Not-So-Great Weight Treaty Deference and the
Article 16(a) Controversy, 51 B.C. L. REV. 797, 798-800 (2010). For more general commentary on the Service Convention and service of process abroad, see Eric Porterfield, Too
Much Process, Not Enough Service InternationalService of Process Under the Hague Service
Convention, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 331 (2014); and Burbank, supra, at 1474-90.

948

ParochialProcedure
69 STAN. L. REV. 941 (2017)

efficiency, and equity. 26 Rather, greater use of presumptions and sequential
decisionmaking can channel judicial discretion to the marginal cases where it
provides the most value, without those marginal cases overtaking-and
distorting-the doctrine as a whole.
I.

The System of Private International Law

The parochial critique, as defined in the next Part, is characterized by a
concern that federal courts' parochial orientation is disrupting the reciprocity
on which private international law depends. The need for reciprocity is
integral to international trade, which requires systems for resolving crossborder disputes. 27 The rules of private international law, as they coalesced in
the late nineteenth century, have grown into one such system that is based in
28
domestic courts and managed through principles of international comity.
"Comity" is a notoriously slippery term, taking on different meanings in
different contexts. 29 This Article understands comity to mean the accommodation of other countries' jurisdictional interests in return for reciprocal
treatment over the long run.30 Especially since the communication and
26. Cf Tobias Barrington Wolff, Discretion in Class Certification, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1897,
1951-52 (2014) (arguing that judges should retain discretion to deny or limit class
certification in response to changing circumstances in order to ensure the continuing
vitality of the class action model).
27. See, e.g., Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an InternationalJudicialSystem, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429,
506 (2003) (noting that international trade requires "a functioning system for cooperative resolution of disputes across borders" that nonetheless allows "each nation to
protect its national, democratically determined interests").
28. See, e.g., Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict Resituating International Comity as
Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 11, 17-43 (2010) (describing the origins and
evolution of comity as the foundation for private international law); Christopher
Whytock, Faith and Scepticism in Private InternationalLaur Trust, Governance, Politics, and
Foreign Judgments, 7 ERASmUs L. REV. 113, 114 (2014) (describing private international
law as decentralized, with allocation of governance authority among nations based on
"principles of conditional deference").
29. See, e.g., N. Jansen Calamita, Rethinking Comity Towards a Coherent Treatment of
InternationalParallelProceedings, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 601, 605 (2006); Joel R. Paul,
Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 3-4 (1991); Michael D. Ramsey,
Escaping "InternationalComity,"83 IOWA L. REV. 893, 893 (1998). For a recent, admirable
effort to clarify the concept of comity, see Dodge, supra note 22, at 2078, which defines
comity as "deference to foreign government actors that is not required by international
law but is incorporated in domestic law."
30. Cf Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (defining comity as "the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts
of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and
to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its
laws"). A difference between my definition of comity and that of Hilton is that Hilton
called for case-specific reciprocity, which is not necessarily a great way to ensure
footnote continued on next page
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transportation revolutions in the late nineteenth century,3 ' multiple countries
may have an interest in adjudicating a given dispute, whether based on the
location of the relevant conduct, the nationality of the parties, or some other
nexus. 32 This is both good and bad from a governance perspective. Overlapping pools of jurisdiction reduce the risk of unintended regulatory gaps. But
they increase the risk of conflict between nation-states, as well as uncertainty
for private parties as to which rules will govern (and which courts will do the
governing). Overreaching by one state can, in turn, prompt the unaccommodated state to retaliate, in particular by refusing to accommodate the
overreaching state's interests in future cases. 33 This general concern for
reciprocity encourages states and their courts to exercise some restraint in
displacing foreign law in transnational disputes, whether in terms of personal
jurisdiction, choice of law, or recognition of a foreign court's prior judgment. 34
Under this cooperative conception of comity, the institutions of one state
may help give effect to the laws or interests of another state. 35 It is important
to keep this traditional, affirmative conception of comity in mind, as comity in
the twentieth century has increasingly come to be associated with restraint or
abstention: in the modern era, U.S. courts concerned about their "inability ... to
systemic reciprocity. See generally John F. Coyle, Rethinking judgments Reciprocity, 92
N.C. L. REV. 1109, 1114-16 (2014) (arguing that such a reciprocity requirement is
unlikely to achieve its intended purpose of increasing foreign enforcement of U.S.
judgments).
31. For the delinking of jurisdiction and territoriality that accompanied these trends, see
generally KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION
EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERiCAN LAW (2009).

FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE

32. For the nexuses that can establish adjudicatory jurisdiction, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 421

(AM. LAW INST. 1987).

These pools of jurisdiction are even more clearly defined in the context of prescriptive
jurisdiction, or the state's power to regulate certain conduct or actors. See id. § 402. In
that context as well, the margins of those pools-where they overlap with other states'
arguable prescriptive authority-can be sites of controversy and conflict. See Maggie
Gardner, Channeling Unilateralism,56 HARv. INT'L L.J. 297, 303-06 (2015) (describing the
controversial margins of prescriptive jurisdiction).
33. For a concrete example, see the retaliatory legislation described in note 67 below. This
concern for retaliation also motivated the Supreme Court's decision in 1895 that U.S.
courts should presumptively recognize foreign judgments (as long as those foreign
courts would do the same for U.S. judgments). See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 210,227-28.
34. For a recent example of such concerns, see the Supreme Court's discussion of
international comity when narrowing the scope of general personal jurisdiction in
DaimlerAG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746,763 (2014).
35. See Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 90 (describing "the purpose of comity" as "maintain[ing] a
functional international system" that accommodates different sovereign interests); see
also id. at 88 (describing "positive comity" as affirmative acts to protect the interests of
another state (quoting Hannah L. Buxbaum, Cooperative International Regulatory
Enforcement and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in the United States, 43 GER. Y.B.
INT'L L. 171, 181 (2000))).
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gauge the precise implications of their decisions for the delicate subject of
foreign relations" more often invoke comity as a reason to avoid deciding cases
with international elements. 36 But focusing on comity-as-abstention misses
that foreign states' interests-and thus U.S. foreign relations-are often better
protected through judicial accommodation than through judicial abdication.3 7
Thus, throughout the nineteenth century, U.S. courts routinely invoked and
applied foreign law in transnational disputes regarding contracts, property,
and corporate organization.38 As early as the 1850s, Congress explicitly
authorized the federal courts to assist foreign judicial proceedings, at least in
some circumstances, by compelling witness testimony.3 9 And in 1895, the U.S.
Supreme Court famously invoked comity in Hilton v. Guyot to justify a
presumption in favor of enforcing foreign judgments.40
Starting in the late eighteenth century, countries sought to codify aspects
of this affirmative comity, first through bilateral agreements 41 and then

36. Michael P. Van Alstine, Stare Decisis and Foreign Affairs, 61 DUKE LJ. 941, 970 (2012); cf
Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States ForeignRelations Law, 70 U. COLO.
L. REv. 1395, 1402, 1408-09 (1999) (discussing post-World War II foreign relations
doctrine as overcorrecting for structural constitutional concerns by encouraging ad
hoc judicial abstention).
37. See Marco Basile, The Long View on Kiobelk A Muted Victory for InternationalLegal Norms
in the United States?, AJIL UNBOUND (Jan. 2014), in AGORA: REFLECTIONS ON KIOBEL, at e-

13,

e-17 (2014),

https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/AGORA/201401/AJIL%20

Agora-%20Reflections%20on%2OKiobel.pdf ("But declining to adjudicate a case
involving an international issue can affect foreign relations as much as hearing the
case."); Hannah L. Buxbaum, Foreign Governments as Plaintiffs in U.S. Courts and the Case
Against "JudicialImperialism,"73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 653, 656-58 (2016); cf Dodge, supra
note 22, at 2078-79 (distinguishing between comity doctrines based on "restraint" and
those based on "recognition"); Judith Resnik, Constructing the 'Foreign'American Law's
Relationship to Non-Domestic Sources, in COURTS AND COMPARATIVE LAW 437, 439 (Mads
Andenas & Duncan Fairgrieve eds., 2015) (arguing that the use of "foreign" law does not
diminish the legal construction of the United States as a democratic constitutional
order); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1113-15
(2000) (predicting a trend away from comity-as-deference due to the demands of global
integration).
38. See Dodge, supra note 22, at 2088 & nn.92-94 (collecting cases).
39. 1 BRUNO A. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE: CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL

§ 1-1-1, at 5 (rev. 2000).
40. See 159 U.S. 113, 163-64, 227-28 (1895); see also Louise Ellen Teitz, The Story of Hilton:
From Gloves to Globalization, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 445, 447-48 (Kevin M.
Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008) (describing the evolution of the enforcement of foreign
judgments over the course of the nineteenth century).
41. See John F. Coyle, The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in the Modern Era,
51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 302, 307, 314 (2013); Allan Jay Stevenson, Forum Non
Conveniens and Equal Access Under Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties A
ForeignPlaintiffs Rights, 13 HASTINGS INTL & COMP. L. REv. 267,282-83 (1990).
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through multilateral conferences. 42 In 1888 and 1889, South American states
convened in Montevideo, Uruguay to adopt several conventions on private
international law, 43 and continental European states gathered for the First
Hague Conference on Private International Law in 1893 to discuss standardizing conflict-of-laws rules, family law, and civil procedure for transnational
cases. 44 Today, more than 140 countries across multiple continents are
involved in the Hague Conference, which is responsible for thirty-eight
multinational private law conventions now in force. 45 These conventions help
regulate comity by formalizing countries' commitments to providing judicial
assistance and access to courts in transnational disputes.
The United States, however, did not join the Hague Conference until
1964. 6 By that time, growing transnational litigation in U.S. courts-reflecting
increased global trade after World War II-was becoming a source of
international friction. U.S. judges were interpreting U.S. laws, particularly
antitrust laws, to reach extraterritorial conduct based on its effects within the
United States, triggering rounds of diplomatic protests starting in the 1950s. 47
And as U.S. courts heard more transnational cases, "[i]t was soon evident that
the rest of the world was not willing to accept some of the American legal
procedures."4 8 In particular, U.S. court orders compelling broad American-style
discovery from foreign litigants provoked much hostility.49 In response,
France (followed by other states) adopted "blocking statutes" in the 1970s and
1980s that prohibited the production of certain types of evidence located
within its territory for use in U.S. litigation.50 As summarized in the

42. See Draft Convention on Judicial Assistance, with Comment, 33 AM.
1939).

J. INT'L L. 26, 27 (Supp.

43. Comment, The United States and the Hague Conferences on Private InternationalLaw, 1 AM.

J. COMP. L. 268,270 (1952).
44. RISTAU, supra note 39, § 1-1-2, at 9; Georges A.L. Droz, A Comment on the Role of the
Hague Conference on Private InternationalLaw, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1994, at

3,3.
45. See About HCCH, HCCH, https://www.hcch.net/en/about (last visited Apr. 4, 2017).
46. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 911 (5th ed. 2011).
47. See, e.g., id. at 680-82, 971-72 (describing foreign protests in response to U.S. antitrust
investigations of international cartels through the 1980s).
48. Joseph F. Weis, Jr., The Federal Rules and the Hague Conventions Concerns of Conformity
and Comity, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 903, 903 (1989).
49. See, e.g., Born & Hoing, supra note 25, at 395.
50. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 46, at 972-73, 972 n.47 (citing Loi 80-538 du 16 juillet
1980 relative A la communication de documents et renseignements d'ordre economique,
commercial ou technique A des personnes physiques ou morales etrang~res [Law 80-538
of July 16, 1980 on the Disclosure of Documents and Information of an Economic,
Commercial, or Technical Nature to Foreign Individuals or Legal Entities], JOURNAL
footnote continued on next page

952

ParochialProcedure
69 STAN. L. REV. 941(2017)

Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, "[n]o aspect of
the extension of the American legal system beyond the territorial frontier of
the United States has given rise to so much friction as the requests for
documents in investigation and litigation in the United States." 51
The Service Convention and the Evidence Convention were adopted
during this postwar era to ease tensions and improve the efficiency of crossborder cases, in particular by providing some common ground between civil
and common law traditions. 52 For example, in many civil law jurisdictions,
"local judicial authorities supervise all evidence-taking." 53 For foreigners to
take depositions or gather documents in the territory of such a civil law state,
54
then, can trespass on that state's exclusive enforcement jurisdiction. The
Evidence Convention sought to address this problem by channeling requests
for evidence through a government agency, which allows the concerned
55
government some nominal oversight of the evidence collection. Similarly,
56
many countries consider service of process a governmental function.
Foreigners thus raise jurisdictional sensitivities when they attempt to serve
57
judicial documents within other countries' territories. Like the Evidence
Convention, the Service Convention provides a default procedure whereby
cross-border service is channeled through a government agency that is in turn
obliged to ensure that the service is completed.58
The Conventions' success in reconciling these cultural differences,
however, has been mixed.5 9 While some of the fault lies-with those who wrote
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE
1980, p. 1799).

[J.O.]

[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 17,

"Blocking statutes" refers generally to countries' efforts to limit the extraterritorial
reach of another country's laws, judicial power, or judgments. See, e.g., id. at 447-49
(describing blocking statutes adopted by some Latin American countries to discourage
forum non conveniens dismissals by U.S. courts); id. at 682 (describing blocking statutes
limiting enforcement of U.S. antitrust judgments in foreign courts); id. at 972-73
(describing blocking statutes intended to prevent extraterritorial U.S. discovery).
51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§

442,

reporters' note 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
52. See, e.g., Philip W. Amram, The Proposed Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 55

A.B.A. J. 651, 651-52 (1969).
53. Born & Hoing, supra note 25, at 396.
54. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supranote 46, at 969.
55. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 14, ch. I.
56. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supranote 46, at 881.
57. See id. at 909 ("Several nations have imposed sanctions against U.S. process-servers for
attempting to personally deliver U.S. complaints and summonses to foreign defendants.").
58. See Hague Service Convention, supranote 18, arts. 2-6.
59. See infra Part IV.
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and implemented the treaties on behalf of the United States,' 0 judges have
largely borne the blame for parochial results in transnational cases. It is the
scope and tenor of that blame that I hope to temper.
II. The Parochial Critique
Across a range of debates, scholars have worried that U.S. judges are
insufficiently sensitive to the dynamic effects their decisions may have on this
system of private international law. These critiques are united by the concern
that the courts' myopia is hurting the international order and with it the longterm interests of the United States. For shorthand, I call this common theme
the "parochial critique." This Part briefly maps the parochial critique before
identifying its incomplete causal story. It is not necessary to agree with all
aspects of the parochial critique, however, in order to follow the remainder of
the argument: to whatever extent doctrines are problematically parochial in
the aggregate, it does not necessarily follow that individual judges are to blame.
The parochial critique surfaces primarily in two lines of scholarship.6 1 On
the one hand, some scholars have criticized U.S. courts for closing their doors
to transnational litigation, particularly through heavy use of forum non
conveniens 62 but also through other prudential doctrines like standing,
abstention, and act of state.6 3 Pamela Bookman recently labeled this practice
60. Stephen Burbank has argued that U.S. domestication of the Conventions was hampered
by the cultural myopia of diverse institutional actors, from the treaty negotiators to
Congress. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Reluctant Partner Making Procedural Law for
InternationalCivil Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1994, at 103, 132. He is
particularly critical of the Advisory Committee; he sees in the 1993 amendments to
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure an effort "to recapture unilaterally some
of the power that we surrendered in the Service Convention." Id. at 137.
61. Some scholars draw on both perspectives. See, e.g., McFadden, supra note 1, at 8-15
(critiquing several doctrines as both isolationist and imperialist); Ralf Michaels,
Empagran's Empire- International Law and Statutory Interpretation in the U.S. Supreme
Court of the Twenty-First Century, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT:
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 533, 544 (David L. Sloss et al. eds., 2011) ("[T]he choice is
between two kinds of imperialism: one that comes from imposing U.S. law on the rest
of the world, and the other from rejecting access to the courts necessary for protection
against Western corporate actors.").
62. See, e.g., Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation* The Impact
on the Available Alternative Forum Inquiry and on the Desirabilityof Forum Non Conveniens
as a Defense Tactic, 56 U. KAN. L. REv. 609, 609 (2008) ("The motion is not only filed, but
also granted, in nearly every case."); Robertson, supra note 1, at 1084 ("In recent years,
federal judges have been taking a lead in limiting access to U.S. courts by aggressively
enforcing and expanding the doctrine of forum non conveniens.").
63. See, e.g., Bookman, supra note 1, at 1091-99; Coyle, supra note 1, at 445-46; Jodie A.
Kirshner, Why Is the U.S. Abdicating the Policing of MultinationalCorporationsto Europe*
Extraterritoriality,Sovereignty, and the Alien Tort Statute, 30 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 259, 261
(2012); McFadden, supranote 1, at 8-11.
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"litigation isolationism" and tied it to broader antilitigation trends in U.S.
courts.64 "Isolationists" worry that judges, in declining jurisdiction over
65
transnational cases, are aggravating trading partners and creating access-tojustice gaps-whether because plaintiffs may not be able to continue litigation
66
in the foreign forum due to mounting litigation costs, because they may find
67
the foreign forum closed to them due to retaliatory legislation, or because
68
they may not be able to enforce the resulting foreign judgment in U.S. courts.
Some scholars also argue that dismissals for forum non conveniens run counter
69
to U.S. treaty commitments to provide access to U.S. courts. Indeed,
64. See Bookman, supra note 1, at 1085, 1088. On the broader antilitigation trend, see, for
example, Brooke D. Coleman, The Vanishing Plaintiff 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 501 (2012);
Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits:
Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286 (2013); A.
Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 353
(2010); and Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas 0. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil
Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839 (2014).
65. See, e.g., Lear, supra note 1, at 600-01; Robertson, supra note 1, at 1092-93, 1113.
66. See, e.g., Heiser, supra note 62, at 610.
67. Some Latin American states have adopted laws clarifying that their courts cannot hear
cases that were dismissed by the court first seized of the matter on discretionary
grounds like forum non conveniens. See Ronald A. Brand, Challenges to Forum Non
Conveniens, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1003, 1020 & n.56, 1021 & n.59 (2013); Heiser,
supra note 62, at 623 (discussing laws in Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, and
Venezuela). Some U.S. courts have refused to take these foreign statutes into account
when ruling on forum non conveniens, leading to retaliatory cycles that can trap
litigants in the middle. See Heiser, supra note 62, at 623 & n.86 (collecting cases);
Robertson, supra note 1, at 1103-04.
68. Two transnational disputes have received extensive attention in this regard- the Lago
Agrio litigation, see, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012), and the

DBCP pesticide cases, see, e.g., Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Tex. 1995),

affd, 231 F.3d 165 (5th Cir. 2000). In both cases, U.S. district courts dismissed the
complaints for forum non conveniens. See Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 235 & n.3; Delgado, 890 F.
Supp. at 1373. At least some of the plaintiffs were nonetheless able to obtain judgments
in foreign courts; yet the questionable quality of those foreign proceedings has cast
doubt on the enforceability of the resulting judgments back in the United States. See
Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 833 F.3d 74, 80-81, 151 (2d Cir. 2016) (affirming the district
court's decision to enjoin the defendants from seeking to enforce the Ecuadorian
judgment); see also, e.g., Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum
Non Conveniens and the Enforcement of ForeignJudgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 144748, 1476-80 (2011) (describing both cases' procedural histories).
69. For the possibility that forum non conveniens dismissals may conflict with
multilateral treaty commitments, see Intl Arbitration Club of N.Y., Application of the
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Summary Proceedingsfor the Recognition and
Enforcement of Awards Governed by the New York and Panama Conventions, 24 AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 1, 20-22 (2013); and Peter B. Rutledge, With Apologies to Paxton Blair, 45
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1063, 1079 (2013). Cf Melinda R. Lewis, The "Lawfare"of Forum
Non Convenienv Suits by Foreignersin U.S. Courtsfor Air Accidents Occurring Abroad, 78 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 319, 329-33 (2013) (describing disagreements among courts over the
suitability of forum non conveniens dismissals under the Warsaw Convention). For
footnote continued on next page
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commentators have suggested that the courts' overuse of forum non
conveniens, along with broad personal jurisdiction doctrines, hampered the
United States' negotiating position at the Hague Conference in the early 2000s,
which ultimately failed to reach an agreement on a new convention for the
recognition and enforcement of judgments. 70
On the other hand, some scholars worry that when judges do keep transnational cases, they are insensitive to conflicts of adjudicative and prescriptive
jurisdiction. This judicial imperialism manifests in the courts' willingness to
compel discovery located in foreign states despite those states' objections;7 1
their general avoidance of foreign or international law; 72 and their use of
antisuit injunctions to prevent parties from initiating cases or seeking
conflicting relief in foreign courts-injunctions that, while targeted at private
parties, have the effect of encroaching on the adjudicative jurisdiction of
foreign states.73
"Imperialists" link this U.S.-centrism to a breakdown in reciprocity that
traps litigants in the middle. 74 In the discovery context, for example, foreign
states have enacted "blocking statutes" to counter the perceived overreaching
of U.S. courts.75 Foreign parties in U.S. litigation often argue that they should

not be forced to comply with U.S. discovery orders when doing so would
the less likely possibility that forum non conveniens dismissals may conflict with
bilateral treaty commitments, in particular Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation
treaties, see RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 300 (6th
ed. 2010); and Robertson, supra note 1, at 1125-26, which documents a split in judicial
opinion on this issue.
70. See, e.g., BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 46, at 1085; Silberman, supra note 8, at 337-38.
More broadly, the resistance to treaty enforcement by U.S. courts can undermine U.S.
credibility in future treaty negotiations. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway et al., International
Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37 YALEJ. INT'L L. 51, 55 (2012).
71. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Incredible Shrinking Hague Evidence Convention, 38 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 73, 73-74 (2003); Born & Hoing, supra note 25, at 403; Buxbaum, supra note 2, at
93-97; see also infra Part IVA (describing the extent to which U.S. district courts will
compel foreign discovery despite possibly conflicting foreign laws or objections of
foreign states).
72. See, e.g., Coyle, supra note 1, at 447-48 (collecting literature on U.S. judges' tendency to
avoid international law); McFadden, supra note 1, at 5 (asserting that there is "a
thoroughgoing, deeply rooted provincialism-an institutional, almost reflexive,
animosity toward the application of international law in U.S. courts"); Wilson, supra
note 1, at 898-99.
73. See, e.g., Bermann, supra note 2, at 630-31 (listing harms to comity and reciprocity
should U.S. courts use antisuit injunctions to protect the convenience and due process
interests of litigants); Burbank, supra note 23, at 235 (urging restraint in the use of
antisuit injunctions given comity concerns).
74. See Childress, supra note 1, at 1509; McFadden, supra note 1, at 32.
75. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 46, at 972-73 (describing blocking statutes in the
context of discovery).

956

ParochialProcedure
69 STAN. L. REV. 941(2017)

'

violate those blocking statutes or other foreign laws, such as data privacy or
76
bank secrecy laws, but U.S. courts have been unreceptive to such arguments.
More generally, the reluctance of U.S. courts to apply international or foreign
law can undermine the reciprocal recognition of rights, leaving U.S. citizens
and corporations at a disadvantage when they need to seek recourse before
foreign courts.77
In both lines of scholarship, the common assumption has been that this
78
parochialism stems from judges and their provincial views. The solution,
79
then, is to educate judges to use foreign or international law or perhaps to
80
show them how parochial procedure hurts U.S. interests in the long run.
Even when scholars take a more structural view, they urge new statutes or
8
rules meant to constrain parochial judges.
That story of parochial judges, however, is not a fully satisfying explanation for parochial doctrines. If the problem were judges, we might expect to see
consistently parochial outcomes across a range of procedural questions, but we
do not. For instance, in addition to the notorious willingness of U.S. courts to

76. See Michael E. Burke, Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Int'l Law, Report to the House of
Delegates Supporting Resolution 103, at 9-10 (2012),3 https://law.duke.edu/sites/
default/files/images/centers/judicialstudies/ResolutionlO .pdf (noting and critiquing
this lack of receptivity to competing foreign interests); see also infra Part IV.A
(gathering cases and describing this trend).
77. See Samuel P. Baumgartner, Understanding the Obstacles to the Recognition and Enforcement

of U.S. judgments Abroad, 45 N.Y.U.

78.
79.

80.

81.

J. INT'L L. & POL. 965, 982-83, 986 (2013) (arguing that

U.S. courts, in not taking foreign sovereignty concerns seriously, "unwittingly impose
costs on future litigants who attempt to enforce U.S. judgments abroad" and providing
an example of growing German reluctance to enforce U.S. judgments); Hathaway et al.,
supra note 70, at 55 (discussing the reciprocal costs of nonenforcement of treaty rights
by U.S. courts); lontcheva, supra note 2, at 891 (expressing concerns about a breakdown
in reciprocity).
See, e.g., sources cited supranote 5.
See, e.g., McFadden, supra note 1, at 8, 63 (urging "the adoption of judicial education
programs in international law" because "[jludges will likely desire change once they see
the issues and understand the stakes involved"); see also Charney, supra note 5, at 395
(suggesting that judicial aversion to international law could be reduced if judges were
to learn about international law).
See, e.g., Lear, supra note 1, at 562 (arguing that use of forum non conveniens is contrary
to U.S. national interests); Sl. Strong, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreignjudgments in
U.S. Courts. Problems and Possibilities, 33 REV. LITIG. 45, 51 (2014) (urging reform of the
U.S. approach to foreign judgment enforcement because ambiguity in the doctrine has
economic consequences for the United States and its citizens); see also, e.g., Bookman,
supra note 1, at 1123-30 (describing how litigation avoidance doctrines do not
necessarily benefit U.S. defendants in the long run); Coyle, supra note 1, at 435 (noting
that U.S. courts, by consistently declining to apply international law, "lose their ability
to influence the development of that law").
See Coyle, supranote 1, at 470-71; Robertson, supranote 1, at 1127-30.
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enforce foreign money judgments, 82 federal courts are also not necessarily
more likely to apply U.S. law than foreign law in a choice-of-law analysis. 8 3
The next Part proposes a structural story that better explains this pattern
of parochial procedure. If this alternative story is at least plausible, it should
change how reformers approach the task of fixing parochialism. Greater
judicial training and socialization may help, but winning over parochial judges
by itself will not be enough. Indeed, strict rules meant to constrain parochial
judges could overcorrect, removing all judicial discretion when the problem
stems only from its excess.
III. Parochial Pressures
This Part explains how parochialism might still result even if most judges
hold neutral or positive views about transnational cases, foreign litigants, or
international law. Transnational litigation differs from purely domestic
litigation in important, if relatively self-evident, respects. 84 When those
differences are set against the constraints within which judges work, unguided
discretion will predictably build to parochial results. 85 This Part identifies how
constraints on judging intersect with the transnational context to encourage
three doctrinal trends: the search for rubrics, as judges seek to structure and
simplify decisionmaking in unfamiliar areas of law; miscalibration, as judges'
focus on the specific and concrete leads them to overemphasize case
management concerns while marginalizing more abstract systemic interests;
82. See sources cited supra note 8.
83. See Mathias Reimann, Parochialism in American Conflicts Law, 49 AM.J. COMP. L. 369, 387
(2001) ("[Clurrent American conflicts law is not nearly as parochial as its reputation in
many quarters suggests."); Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Messi? InternationalChoice
of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 719, 764 (2009) (finding that district court judges in
international choice-of-law decisions determine that domestic law should apply in
fewer than half of available opinions and concluding that these decisions "are not
biased in favor of domestic law [or] domestic parties").
84. See infra text accompanying notes 102-04.
85. By "discretion," this Article refers primarily to the use of standards that delegate to
decisionmakers the promulgation of legal commands ex post. See Kaplow, supra
note 12, at 561-62. That substantive discretion can be amplified by a secondary rule of
discretion: the shielding of district court decisionmaking from meaningful appellate
review. See Judge Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, Randolph W.
Thrower Lecture in Law and Public Policy (Apr. 14,1982), in 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 754-55
(1982) (distinguishing between these two types of discretion and critiquing in
particular the abuse of discretion standard adopted by the Supreme Court in Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981)); see also Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward
Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1561, 1565-66 (2003) (describing the distinction
between primary and secondary discretion). The combination of the two forms of
discretion, as in the discovery and forum non conveniens contexts, can amplify the
parochial pressures described in this Part.
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and ossification, as judges fill in harder-to-ascertain factors-typically those
intended to protect comity interests-by relying on prior judicial opinions.
The accumulated weight of these three trends creates path dependence toward
parochial outcomes, even in the absence of binding authority.
A.

Of Constraints and Aggregated Effects

In identifying constraints on judicial decisionmaking, the following
discussion draws on two familiar and increasingly integrated literatures. The
first identifies how judges are constrained by institutional capacity. As cases
become more complex or esoteric, the courts' limited time and information and
their case-specific focus become meaningful constraints that can lead to
increased error rates.86 The second establishes that judges are prone to the same
87
cognitive shortcuts as the rest of us, though perhaps to a different degree. As
information becomes more complex, we all default to subconscious heuristics,
or rules of thumb, in order to process information in an acceptably efficient
manner.88 These two sets of constraints are interconnected: limits on time and

89
information, for example, increase reliance on subconscious heuristics. As a
result, the pressures imposed by these constraints may be particularly
pronounced in the procedural context, where time and information are often

limited.
Two categories of heuristics are particularly helpful in explaining the
patterns of parochialism in transnational litigation. The first is the use of
stopping rules, or simplified decisionmaking strategies for reaching
90
satisfactory rather than optimal decisions. That is, instead of optimizing
every decision, humans "satisfice": they consider a finite amount of
information, maybe as few as two or three factors, to reach a good enough
91
approximation of "correct" outcomes. The second is salience, "a heuristic that
causes decisionmakers to overweight the importance of vivid, concrete
86. See, e.g., Peter B. Rutledge, Toward a Functional Approach to Sovereign Equality, 53 VA. J.
INT'L L. 181, 192 (2012); Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 11, at 922.
87. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 787-816 (2001)
(summarizing survey results that suggest judges are susceptible to common cognitive
shortcuts like anchoring, framing, hindsight bias, egocentric biases, and the representativeness heuristic).
88. For an introduction to heuristics in decisionmaking, see generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN,
THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
89. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY
OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 3 (2006); Guthrie et al., supra note 87, at 783.
90. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science- Removing the
RationalityAssumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1077-78 (2000).
91. See id. at 1077-79; see also Beebe, supra note 10, at 1601 & nn.87-88, 1602 & nn.89-91
(collecting research on stopping rules).
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foreground information and to underweight the importance of abstract,
aggregated background information." 92 Being human, a judge cannot ignore
the specifics of a case, its parties, and its impact on her day-to-day work.93
To be clear, heuristics like these are not inherently bad; particularly when
the stakes are not high (at least from the perspective of the judge), the over- or
underinclusiveness that results from "fast and frugal" heuristics will be
tolerable, perhaps even necessary, to prevent decisional gridlock. 94 But the
accumulation of precedent that reflects cognitive shortcuts can lead over time
to unintentional-and potentially problematic-developments in the doctrine.
To see why, consider that the common law is inherently path dependentand not just because of the constraint of binding precedent.9 5 Judges may
follow nonbinding precedent even if it is suboptimal for any number of
reasons. First, and most fundamentally, our legal culture is deeply committed
to consistency across cases; all lawyers, including judges (and their clerks), are
trained to distill the law from prior opinions. 96 What judges write in published
opinions thus matters for what future judges do. In social terms, judges may
overdefer to their peers' prior work because of a professional interest in
avoiding conflict with colleagues, minimizing the risk of reversal on appeal,
and conforming more broadly to the judicial consensus. 97 Behavioral
psychology suggests that judges may stick with suboptimal prior practice due
to commitment effects, egocentric bias, or the weight of habit. 98 In
institutional terms, judges also conserve scarce resources when they avoid
reinventing the wheel. 99 And to the extent precedent is binding, or at least
must be distinguished, the order in which cases arise can meaningfully
constrain the future development of the law: in deciding one case, for example,
92. VERMEULE, supra note 89, at 38.
93. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 10, at 895 (discussing the distorting effect of salience on
common law decisionmaking).
94. While the literature usually associates over- and underinclusiveness with the
application of rules, standards can also result in over- and underinclusiveness due to
these simplifying heuristics. See Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 10, at 90 (predicting
that overworked generalist judges will satisfice by using standards to "dispose of a wide
variety of cases on simple threshold issues").
95. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Lauc The Course and Pattern of
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOwA L. REV. 601 (2001) (discussing the
problem of path dependence in the common law).
96. See id. at 627.
97. See Bainbridge & Gulati, supranote 10, at 116-17; Hathaway, supranote 95, at 625.
98. See Robert G. Bone, Who Decidesik A CriticalLook at ProceduralDiscretion, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1961, 1990 n.122 (2007); cf Korobkin & Ulen, supranote 90, at 1114 (noting that the
habit of repeating behaviors is a heuristic individuals use to approximate utilitymaximizing behavior).
99. See Hathaway, supra note 95, at 626.
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a court may foreclose an option that would otherwise have been the preferable
solution in the next case.100 Further, all of these pressures toward conformity
are compounded as precedent accumulates. 101
Building on these background principles, the following discussion explores three ways in which institutional and behavioral constraints on judges
can encourage problematic path dependence in the common law toward
consistently parochial outcomes.
B.

Complexity and the Search for Rubrics

Transnational litigation is complex. The intricacies of international and
foreign law are often unfamiliar to U.S. judges, and there are multiple
conflicting layers of stakeholders and interests. Routine procedural decisions02
often already unwieldy in their complexity l -require judges in the
transnational context to also weigh possible conflicts with foreign states' laws,
police global forum shopping, account for U.S. treaty commitments, and
103
Further, the international
predict the possible reaction of foreign states.
dimensions of these procedural questions can be intimidating to the
uninitiated. International law is more than a separate substantive field of law; it
has its own superstructure for determining when to apply international law
and what the content of that law is. The same is true for choice of law across
domestic legal regimes. Judges inexperienced with the substance of
international law, whether public or private, will still be aware of this
1
heightened degree of complexity when they approach transnational cases. 0

100. See id. at 645 (discussing a theory of sequential decisionmaking); Lewis A. Kornhauser,

Modeling Collegial Courts 1 Legal Doctrine, 8 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 441, 444-45 (1992)

(identifying how decisional structures and ordering can create path dependence in the
evolution of doctrines); see also Hathaway, supra note 95, at 638 (analogizing to the
evolutionary conception of path dependence to argue that the common law will not
necessarily develop toward efficient results).
101. Cf Friendly, supra note 85, at 772 (noting how the weight of district court precedent
builds over time to narrow the effective scope of judicial discretion).
102. See generally, e.g., Bone, supra note 98 (critiquing open-ended discretion in procedural
doctrines more generally based on bounded rationality, information access obstacles,
and strategic interaction effects).
103. Add to this the reality that federal opinions are often drafted by law clerks, typically
recent law school graduates with even less experience in the procedural aspects of
transnational litigation, or written by magistrate judges, who operate under similar
constraints but with even fewer resources and (often) an even narrower issue-specific
focus.
104. See Wilson, supra note 1, at 897-98; cf Coyle, supra note 1, at 453-55 (collecting
literature on judges' inexperience with the methodology and substance of international
law and noting its inevitable impact on judicial decisionmaking).
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Humans have a limited capacity for complexity; we cannot assess, for
instance, an infinite array of permutations.105 As an environment becomes
more complex and a decisionmaker's competence less certain, allowing greater
flexibility in decisionmaking can lead to worse, not better, results.1 06 Left with
broad discretion in the face of an open-ended standard, decisionmakers will
thus gravitate toward structure and simplicity, a process some have termed
"rulification."107
There are both strong and weak versions of this rulification phenomenon.
At its most basic, rulification is inherent in the common law process, as
subsequent decisions narrow the breadth of a standard over time through
application to particular facts. 108 The stronger version-and the version
invoked here-asserts that judges seek out rubrics in order to make broad
standards more manageable.'" Such rubrics have the additional benefit of
lending legitimacy to courts' reasoning and holdings.
The search for rubrics is not itself problematic. The difficulty starts with
the choice of rubric. The unfamiliarity and complexity of transnational
litigation increases the risk that judges will look for rubrics in the wrong
places. For example, courts may import tests from insufficiently similar
contexts, particularly domestic analogues that do not translate perfectly to the
international law context. Given their domestic origins, these transplanted
105. See Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 10, at 101; Beebe, supra note 10, at 1601; Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REv. 61,
61(2000).
106. See Ronald A. Heiner, The Origin of PredictableBehavior, 73 AM. EcoN. REv. 560, 563, 565
(1983) (positing that "there is greater uncertainty as either an agent's perceptual abilities
become less reliable or the environment becomes more complex" and explaining that
"when genuine uncertainty [thus defined] exists, allowing greater flexibility to react to
more information or administer a more complex repertoire of actions will not
necessarily enhance an agent's performance"); Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice
and the Rulification of Standards, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803, 811-12 (2005) ("The
basic point is that ... having too many options is frustrating and suboptimal, and that
when faced with too much choice people will seek to narrow the range of choices by
quick heuristics. We want decisional guidance, we want a smaller number of options,
and we want to have our decisional processes structured."). This insight into the
connection between complexity and the limits on human capacity to process
information suggests that rational choice theories of common law decisionmaking, cf,
e.g., Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of Common Law, 115 J. POL. EcoN.
43, 62 (2007) (concluding that the common law will evolve under most conditions
toward more efficient outcomes as rules become more complex), may be overly
optimistic.
107. I am indebted to Michael Coenen's recent article Rules Against Rulification for my
thinking on this process and for bringing to my attention Frederick Schauer's essay on
the same phenomenon. See Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 YALE L.J. 644,
648 n.13 (2014) (citing Schauer, supra note 106).
108. See id. at 654-55, 654 n.26.
109. See Schauer, supranote 106, at 811-12.
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tests will emphasize domestic considerations and may not account explicitly
for comity concerns. 110
Alternatively, even when Supreme Court opinions expressly decline to
establish a test, lower courts may still glean a rubric from those opinions, in
effect generalizing factors the Court intended to apply only to the case at
hand. 11 This may lead judges to infer too much from the Court's opinion. For
example, if the Court did not find the balancing of sovereign interests
previously struck by the political branches (such as through treaties or statutes)
to be compelling in one case, future judges may assume that something moresome greater foreign or systemic interest than was present in the Supreme
Court case-is always required for the balance to tip in favor of foreign
interests. 112 This discounting of the political balance is problematic if one
thinks the political branches are better equipped than courts to evaluate and
weigh competing sovereign interests.
Finally, even when the Supreme Court does acknowledge the relevance of
particular factors, the lower courts may still simplify those factors in search of
a clearer framework.11 3 Such simplification may distort the Court's intended
rubric, deemphasizing important but difficult considerations.
Furthermore, whatever the source of error in the choice of rubric, the
distortion that error invites will be compounded over time. As more courts
apply a certain rubric, path dependence grows and it becomes harder to opt for

110. See infra Part IV.B (discussing forum non conveniens). For the cross-fertilization
between domestic and international inquiries in civil procedure more generally, see
Burbank, supranote 25, at 1459-73; and Dubinsky, supranote 2, at 312, 342. As Burbank
has noted, this focus on national uniformity can be explained not only by the draw of
the familiar but also by the cult of transsubstantivity, which values national uniformity over international harmony. See Burbank, supranote 60, at 135, 138.
Similarly, in the criminal context, some federal circuits have transplanted domestic due
process analysis to evaluate the separate question whether the United States may, as a
matter of international law, reach criminal conduct beyond its borders. See Anthony J.
Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the
Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT'L LJ. 121, 124-25 (2007)
(proposing a reformed due process analysis that incorporates the perspective of
international law).
ill. Thus, for example, even though the Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947),
disclaimed any intent to establish a test for forum non conveniens, see id. at 508, the
factors it listed have nonetheless become coterminous with the doctrine, see infra
Part IV.B (discussing the Gilberttest as applied in modern transnational cases).
112. This tendency manifested, for example, in district courts' analysis of the Evidence
Convention following the Supreme Court's intervention. See infra Part IVA.
113. Cf Beebe, supra note 10, at 1588 (finding such a pattern in the evolution of a unified
multifactor test for trademark infringement from two different multifactor tests in the
1938 Restatement(First)of Torts).
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a different framework-even if the initial rubric's shortcomings also become
more apparent with each application.1 14
C. Case Myopia and the Miscalibration of Factors
Whatever rubric judges apply (but particularly if it is an ill-fitting one),
the role and weight of different factors within that rubric will become lopsided
over time if they are not well considered. This follows from the unavoidable
fact that trial courts decide particular cases. Even before the advent of
behavioral psychology, scholars recognized that judges' case-specific focus can
have a distorting effect.115
The facts of the case-what is concrete and immediately before the judgedraw the attention of the decisionmaker in a way that abstract or unfamiliar
interests do not. In a procedural context, such concrete and immediate facts
include concerns like efficiency, delay, docket congestion, gamesmanship, and
the short-term interests of sympathetic parties. Especially if judges are trying
to make sense of a poorly fitting framework, such case management concerns
provide familiar touchstones. Put another way, transnational litigation is a
complex field in which the stakes in individual cases may be low but the cost of
fully informed decisions would be high. In such a context, judges may
(consciously or unconsciously) use extremely abbreviated stopping rules,
making "good enough" decisions after considering only one or two factorsand the factors they focus on first are likely to be those most salient and most
readily ascertainable. 116
Meanwhile, factors that protect systemic interests-like the long-term
reciprocity on which private international law depends-may be acknowledged but will remain relatively underdeveloped. It is not that these systemic
interests will be ignored entirely. But even though judges are increasingly
aware of the insights from behavioral psychology, they may still overestimate
114. See Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 10, at 116-17 (discussing the adoption of
decisionmaking heuristics in terms of herd behavior); Bone, supra note 98, at 1990 n.122
("[I]n the absence of strong feedback, a combination of framing, the escalating
commitment effect, and the egocentric bias can cause a judge to lock into a routine set
of practices even when those practices are suboptimal or flawed.").
115. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: THE CLASSIc LECTURES ON THE LAW AND
LAW SCHOOL 58-59 (Oxford Univ. Press 11th prtg. 2008) (1930); Schauer, supra note 10,
at 899 (discussing the realist insight that the "immediate equities" of a particular case
will have a mesmerizing hold on the judicial mind); see also VERMEULE, supra note 89, at
3 (asserting that the cognitive constraints experienced by judges "are exacerbated by
the case-by-case decisionmaking procedure that defines adjudication-a procedure that
emphasises the salience of particulars and hampers judges in discerning the systemic
effects" of the decisionmaking structures they adopt).
116. See Beebe, supra note 10, at 1601-02; see also Kaplow, supra note 12, at 594 (noting that
juries, as decisionmakers, often make decisions based on only a few relevant factors).
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their ability to discern foreign sovereign interests, find foreign facts, or
otherwise account for dynamic effects.117 Thus, even when rubrics
acknowledge comity-based factors, the natural tendency to focus on the
particular case-on concerns that are concrete and immediate-can lead a
11 8
For
decisionmaker to gloss over more abstract, long-term interests.
example, consider the district courts' experience applying the rubric for
specific personal jurisdiction that emerged from Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court,119 which "seemed to require courts to take a serious look at the
impact of U.S. procedural rules on the litigants, the internal dynamics of other
120
societies, and good relations between the United States and other countries."
Rather than focus on those systemic interests, "lower courts have been guided
instead by intuition, easy-to-measure variables, and a preoccupation with
whether the defendant will be unduly burdened by having to defend litigation
in the forum." 121 The concrete and the familiar are addressed first; the
unfamiliar and the difficult tag along at the end, underapplied and thus
underdeveloped.
It might be helpful here to distinguish between individual cases and
aggregated effects. It is unsurprising, and perhaps not particularly troubling,
that judges in individual cases focus on the local and immediate. Judges are,
after all, employed to apply law to particular facts. The difficulty is that,
repeated across cases, a localized focus means case management factors receive
the greatest attention and development and thus have increasing prominence
under abbreviated stopping rules. Meanwhile, the less salient factors-those
related to abstract systemic or foreign interests-are most at risk of ossification.
D. Uncertain Facts and Ossified Factors
Even when these evolving rubrics acknowledge foreign or systemic
interests, those factors are the most likely to turn on facts that are difficult to
ascertain. Consider "facts" like the efficiency or fairness of foreign judicial
systems or the sovereign interests embodied in foreign legislation. Discerning
such facts entails high information costs, and even with good information,
117. See Guthrie et al., supranote 87, at 813-15 (finding judges to be susceptible to "egocentric
biases," which lead judges to overestimate their professional ability to reach correct
conclusions); Rachlinski, supra note 105, at 66 (finding that judges are more likely to
overlook cognitive illusions "[w]hen judges both determine the procedural rules that
govern fact-finding and decide the facts themselves").
118. Cf Schauer, supra note 10, at 901 & nn.72-74 (gathering psychological research on the
exclusionary effect of focusing on particular tasks and analogizing it to a judge's focus
on a particular case).
119. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
120. Dubinsky, supra note 2, at 327.
121. Id.
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those findings may still be inherently subjective or uncertain. 122 These
difficulties are further compounded by the ancillary nature of factfinding in
the procedural context: these are not facts related to the merits that will be
developed through full discovery, much less through trial.
How, then, can judges obtain the information they need to assess these
factors? Party submissions, expert declarations, and amicus briefs may provide
helpful information. But in an adversarial system, they can be presumed to
reflect party bias and routine reliance on them will favor better-funded
parties.1 23 Foreign states may express their views directly in U.S. litigation, but
even though courts invite such input in theory, 124 they may discount it in
practice.1 25 Then there is the judge's own factual research or personal intuition,
reliance on either of which raises concerns about due process and error rates in
an adversarial system. 126 That leaves prior judicial opinions as the most
122. Much has been written about the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts.
&

See, e.g., Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1759
n.2, 1774 (2014) (summarizing the literature). The foreign facts involved in transna-

tional procedural determinations occupy a middle ground: they are not specific to the
case at hand, but neither are they broad facts about the world used to shape prospective
rules. Rather, they are general facts required to evaluate the application of law to a

given circumstance. Cf Frederick Schauer, The Decline of "the Record" A Comment on
Posner, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 51, 59-60 (2013) (identifying a possible middle ground between
legislative and adjudicative facts and critiquing judges' ascertainment of these facts

through independent research).
123. Cf Larsen, supra note 122, at 1784 (critiquing Supreme Court reliance on amicus briefs
for factfinding because "the factual data amici present to the Court ... are all funneled

through an advocacy sieve," which results in "periodic unreliability").
124. See, e.g., Milliken & Co. v. Bank of China, 758 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting

that a foreign ministry's failure to voice objections to disclosure in a particular case
"militates against a finding that strong national interests of the foreign country are at
stake" (quoting Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, No. 09 Civ. 8458(RJS)(THK), 2010
WL 808639, at "'6(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010))); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A. (Strauss 1),

242 F.RD. 199,219 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (reaching a similar conclusion).
125. See, e.g., Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A. (Strauss I, 249 F.R.D. 429, 443, 448 (E.D.N.Y.
2008) (finding that a letter from the French Ministry of Justice "merely restate[d]

French law, and vaguely note[d] French sovereignty," but did not address the current
dispute with adequate particularity); Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm Corp., 118 F.R.D.
386, 391 (D.N.J. 1987) (finding that a declaration of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign
Affairs provided "merely general reasons why Sweden prefers civil law discovery
procedures").
126. See Jeffrey Bellin & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Trial by Google* Judicial Notice in the
Information Age, 108 Nw. U. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2014) ("[T]he ease of accessing factual
data now available on the Internet will allow judges and litigants to expand the use of

judicial notice in ways that raise significant concerns about admissibility, reliability,
and fair process."); Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme CourtFact Finding, 98 VA. L.

REV. 1255, 1290-305 (2012); see also Martin Davies, Time to Change the FederalForum Non

Conveniens Analysis, 77 TUL. L. REV. 309, 322 (2002) (critiquing judicial recourse to
publicly available material in the forum non conveniens context as displacing the
defendant's onus of persuasion).
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accessible and perhaps the most reliable source of information about foreign
facts. Particularly if judges perceive prior courts to have had access to superior
information, they may turn to those opinions to bolster or replace their own
limited factfinding.1 27
This reliance on precedent will in turn have two predictable effects: First,
factors based on difficult-to-ascertain facts (such as those related to foreign and
systemic interests) will ossify as a dictum is repeated until it becomes law in the
form of a string citation. 128 Second, the ossified factors will generalize as they
are invoked across a broader range of cases, what Allison Orr Larsen has called
"imported factual precedents."1 29 Thus, for example, courts have reduced the
evaluation of "U.S. interests" in transnational discovery disputes to the U.S.
interest in full and fair adjudication before U.S. courts-an interest so general as
to be a truism. 130 As ossified and generalized factors obviate the need to reassess
difficult-to-ascertain facts in each case, the resulting chains of inter- and
intradistrict citation also limit the range of plausible findings in future
decisions.
In the end, then, judges may think they are applying tests that support the
rough reciprocity of private international law, but those tests-as they have
evolved over time-may be set up to fail. When trial judges are left with broad
discretion to resolve unfamiliar questions of law in complex circumstances,
there is a risk they will latch onto rubrics that are a poor fit; that those rubrics
will come to overemphasize case management concerns and undervalue
systemic interests; and that individual judges' inability to evaluate foreign facts
and systemic interests as part of routine procedural decisions will increasingly
ossify, generalize, and ultimately marginalize factors initially meant to protect
comity. As time passes and precedent mounts, it becomes increasingly difficult
for individual judges to correct course, whether by reverting to the initial
broad standard or by proposing an alternative framework.

127. Cf Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 10, at 117 ("Under conditions of complexity and
uncertainty, actors who perceive themselves as having limited information and can
observe the actions of presumptively better-informed persons may attempt to free ride
by following the latter's decisions."). See generally Allison Orr Larsen, FactualPrecedents,
162 U. PA. L. REv. 59 (2013) (describing and criticizing lower courts' reliance on factual
findings made by the Supreme Court).
128. See, e.g., infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text (documenting the ossification of the
judicial finding that conducting discovery through the Evidence Convention would be
unduly time consuming).
129. Larsen, supranote 127, at 81-83.
130. See infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text; cf Dubinsky, supra note 2, at 327
(describing similar oversimplification of U.S. interests in the context of personal
jurisdiction determinations).
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IV. When Is Procedure Parochial?
This Part surveys four common procedural questions that arise in transnational litigation: the use of the Evidence Convention in interparty discovery
disputes, motions to dismiss for forum non conveniens, service of process
abroad under the Service Convention, and the recognition of foreign
judgments. The federal courts have been criticized for parochialism in their
handling of the first two issues1 31 but not of the latter two. This Part proposes
that this difference may be explained by the structure of the doctrines used to
decide each issue: the doctrines governing use of the Evidence Convention and
forum non conveniens were framed initially as an open-ended standard and a
broad balancing test, respectively, while those governing use of the Service
Convention and recognition of foreign judgments were framed as strong
presumptions with enumerated exceptions.
A.

The Hague Evidence Convention

Neither the Evidence Convention itself nor the Supreme Court's interpretation of it in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court'32 has
provided district courts with adequate guidance on when the Evidence
Convention should be used to manage cross-border discovery. The parochial
pressures described above can explain why district courts have developed an
analysis that consistently reaches the same result: the rejection of the Evidence
Convention in favor of broader discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 133 At least when it comes to managing interparty discovery, the
Evidence Convention in U.S. federal courts is a dead letter.
When the Evidence Convention was adopted, a chasm separated how civil
and common law countries conducted evidence gathering for private
litigation-and even among common law countries, the United States' broad
discovery practice was an outlier. 134 Perhaps because of this cultural distance,
the Convention was a limited agreement. It created a clear obligation in one
regard only: the country where the evidence is located must help facilitate its
collection. Specifically, each member state must establish a Central Authority
that can receive and coordinate requests for discovery from other countries; 13 5
facilitate all requests made through its Central Authority, subject to a few

131. See sources cited infra notes 163, 219.

132. 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
133. See infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
134. See James A.R. Nafziger, Another Look at the Hague Evidence Convention After

Arospatiale, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 103, 104-05 (2003).
135. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 14, art. 2.
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specified exceptions; 136 and compel private parties' compliance with those
37
requests to the same extent it would for domestic proceedings.1 But beyond
the obligation of the receiving state to fulfill discovery requests made through
the Central Authority mechanism, the Convention becomes less definite. In
particular, the Convention is not clear about when a country requesting
evidence must use the Central Authority system.1 38 It appears that states did
39
not give this question much thought when negotiating the Convention, and
today member states continue to disagree about whether use of the Convention
is mandatory.140
That murkiness has been compounded by Aerospatiale, the U.S. Supreme
Court's sole decision interpreting the Evidence Convention. The petitioners in
Aerospatiale were corporations owned by the French government that had
designed, manufactured, and marketed a small aircraft that crashed in lowa.141
The French petitioners initially engaged in discovery under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedurel 42 but then sought a protective order against further
discovery.1 43 They argued that the requested evidence was located in France
and was covered by the French blocking statute; to avoid running afoul of this
French law, they could only respond to discovery requests that complied with
the Convention.144 The Court rejected the petitioners' argument that the
Convention provided the exclusive means for obtaining evidence located in a
state party to the Convention. 145 Instead, the Court held that the Convention's

136. A Central Authority can object to a request if the request does not comply with the
Evidence Convention's requirements, id. art. 5, and it can only refuse to execute a
request if the execution would prejudice the state's "sovereignty or security" or if the
request "does not fall within the functions of [that state's] judiciary," id. art. 12. The
Convention specifically prohibits a Central Authority from refusing assistance because
its government claims exclusive jurisdiction over the action or because its internal law
would not recognize such a right of action. Id.
137. Id. art. 10.
138. See Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private Intl Law, The
Mandatory/Non-Mandatory Character of the Evidence Convention 11 30-31 (2008),
https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/2008pdl0e.pdf.
139. See id. ¶ 42 ("[T]he question whether the Convention is mandatory or non-mandatory
was not actively considered at the time of negotiation, norfor some time thereafter.").
140. See id. 1.
141. Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Mrospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 524-25
(1987).
142. Id. at 525 & n.4.
143. Id. at 525.
144. Id. at 526 & n.6.
145. Id. at 533-34.
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procedures are "optional" and "available whenever they will facilitate the
gathering of evidence."146
But the Court split 5-4 on how district courts are to determine when use of
the Evidence Convention is nonetheless appropriate. The majority rejected a
rule of first resort to the Convention, whether based on the treaty's text or as a
matter of comity.147 Instead, it directed courts to undertake a "particularized
analysis" of the international comity at stake in each case, and it refused to
"articulate specific rules to guide this delicate task of adjudication."148
As Justice Blackmun emphasized in partial dissent, this open-ended
standard was doomed to fail.149 Courts, he reasoned, are "ill equipped" to
balance foreign interests with U.S. interests and too likely to default to familiar
domestic procedures.W Instead, judges should defer to the balance already
struck by the political branches in negotiating and adopting the Evidence
Convention. 151 Justice Blackmun thus proposed a "general presumption" that
the Convention should apply whenever discovery is located abroad. 152 Only if
there were a "true conflict" between foreign and domestic law would courts
need to engage in balancing "foreign interests, domestic interests, and the
interest in a well-functioning international order."1 5 3 Ultimately, Justice
Blackmun predicted that the Court's "case-by-case comity analysis .

.

. will be

performed inadequately and that the somewhat unfamiliar procedures of the
Convention will be invoked infrequently." 154
Justice Blackmun's prediction, echoed by others, 155 has been borne out by
the practice of the district courts. Since Aerospatiale, out of 66 written district
court opinions that explicitly considered whether parties must use the
146. Id. at 541.
147. Id. at 542-44.

148. Id. at 543-44, 546.
149. Id. at 548 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun
was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor. Id. at 547.
150. Id. at 552-53.
151. Id. at 551-53, 556.
152. Id. at 548-49. This presumption would be derived not from the terms of the Evidence
Convention but from the principle of comity: namely, that the system of private
international law would be best served by initial resort to procedures agreed upon by
the affected foreign state. See id.
153. Id. at 555-56.
154. Id. at 548.
155. See, e.g., In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288, 306 (3d Cir. 2004)
(Roth, J., concurring) ("Unfortunately, I believe the language used in [Aerospatiale has
unintentionally compounded
the problem inherent with the [Evidence]
Convention . . . . [R]ather than wade through the mire of a complex set of foreign
statutes and case law, judges marginalize the Convention as an unnecessary 'option.'").
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Evidence Convention to obtain discovery from each other, only 5 have held
that they must-and 4 of those decisions were written in the first few years
following Aerospatiale.15 6 In all other cases considering the issue, even in the
face of potentially conflicting foreign statutes, the courts have allowed
157
discovery to proceed more broadly under the Federal Rules.
Granted, conclusions about district court discovery practice based solely
on written opinions must be qualified. As the limited number of available
158
opinions attests, courts rarely write up their discovery orders, few are made
156. In a case decided one week after Airospatiale, for example, the judge thought the foreign
defendant's arguments for use of the Evidence Convention "look[ed] persuasive" and,
given that the plaintiffs had not challenged those arguments, denied the plaintiffs'
motion to compel under the Federal Rules but "without prejudice to its renewal"
should plaintiffs wish to respond. Panara v. Hertz Penske Truck Leasing, Inc., Civ. A.

No. 86-4358, 1987 WL 12782, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 22, 1987). In another early case, the

court worried that it lacked jurisdiction over the foreign defendant; almost five
months after it ordered jurisdictional discovery to proceed under the Evidence
Convention, Jenco v. Martech Intl, Inc., Civ. A. No. 86-4229, 1988 WL 54733, at *1 (E.D.
La. May 19, 1988), it dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, Jenco v. Martech Int'l, Inc., CIV. A. No. 86-4229, 1988 WL 106318, at *1-2

(E.D. La. Oct. 7, 1988).
Two other early opinions that required use of the Evidence Convention offered more
thorough analysis and are discussed in greater detail below. See In re Perrier Bottled
Water Litig., 138 F.R.D. 348, 352-56 (D. Conn. 1991); Hudson v. Hermann Pfauter
GmbH & Co., 117 F.R.D. 33, 37-40 (N.D.N.Y. 1987). Since 1991, the only other case I have
been able to identify that required use of the Convention for interparty discovery
involved a foreign plaintiff seeking to depose the foreign employees of a foreign
defendant located in France. See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ.5571

RJH, 2004 WL 3019766, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30,2004).
157. My claim here is not empirical but rather an effort to identify a clear trend in the
available written opinions. A brief word about methodology, however, may help those
interested in district court practice to recreate this set of cases. I searched the Westlaw
database of federal district court opinions for cases since Aerospatiale that included
"Hague" within three words of "convention" and within the same paragraph as
"discovery" (to minimize cases discussing other Hague Conventions) or that cited
Aerospatiale(to capture cases that referred to the Evidence Convention more obliquely).
This returned over six hundred cases as of February 24, 2016. Research assistants
screened these cases to identify those that discussed the Evidence Convention in the
context of interparty discovery, which I then reviewed. I included in the final count
those cases where the judge characterized a foreign witness or foreign document
custodian as a managing agent of the defendant, which allows the evidence to be
compelled under the Federal Rules and thereby obviates the need to use the Convention to reach what would otherwise be third-party discovery. I did not include
subsequent opinions in which the judge reaffirmed his or her prior decision, and I did
not include magistrate decisions when confirmed by later written district court
decisions. I did include, however, Judge Hogan's separate decisions in In re Vitamins
Antitrust Litigation regarding both jurisdictional and merits discovery. See No. 99197TFH, 2001 WL 1049433, at -1, *14-15 (D.D.C. June 20, 2001) (regarding merits

discovery); 120 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 2000) (regarding jurisdictional discovery).

158. David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.

681, 715, 719-21 (2007).
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available on the commercial databases, 15 9 and even fewer are ever subject to
review by higher courts.160 It is possible that courts, in harder-to-observe
bench rulings or summary orders, are requiring parties to use Evidence
Convention procedures.' 6 1 These source limitations are nonetheless offset by
two additional considerations: First, given the overwhelming proportion of
published decisions that reject application of the Convention, it seems unlikely
that courts are routinely reaching the opposite conclusion in unelaborated
decisions.1 62 Second, and more significantly, the pattern of decisionmaking I
am interested in here is informed by the earlier decisions to which trial judges
have access, namely those made available through commercial databases.
Indeed, the increasing rarity of such written decisions suggests that the
uniformity of outcome is deterring at least some foreign parties from invoking
the Convention in the first place.
Scholars have criticized this rejection of the Evidence Convention by U.S.
courts as parochial.1 63 Even if use of the treaty is not mandatory, it does seem
contrary to the spirit of the treaty for courts to consistently ignore its
mediating procedures when confronted with conflicting sovereign interests.
Yet this trend away from using the Convention in interparty disputes does not
necessarily reflect individual judges' dislike or distrust of such treaties. Indeed,
159. For the selection problems posed by reliance on the commercial databases, see, for
example, David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil
Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REv. 1203, 1214-15 (2013); and Hoffman et al., supra note 158, at

688.
160. See Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374, 411, 413 (1982) (describing
how district court judges' pretrial decisions regarding case management largely evade
appellate review). Indeed, Aerospatialeitself only reached the Supreme Court after the
French corporations obtained a writ of mandamus from the Eighth Circuit for review
of an interlocutory discovery order. Socidt6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. U.S.

Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 527-28 (1987).

161. See Hoffmanet al., supra note 158, at 732-33 (suggesting in particular that judges write
opinions about discovery orders precisely when those orders are "black sheep").
162. For a contrary view, reasoning that litigants are using the Evidence Convention
voluntarily and that only the "tough cases" are reaching judges, see Nafziger, supra
note 134, at 114. For example, Judge Scheindlin in Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd. initially
granted (without written decision) the foreign defendant's request to pursue discovery
through the Convention, to which the plaintiffs had consented. See 910 F. Supp. 2d 548,
551 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). But after more than a year passed without the Chinese Central
Authority returning any evidence in response to the Convention request, Judge
Scheindlin held (in a written decision) that discovery would be compelled under the
Federal Rules. Id. at 555-61.
163. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 71, at 74; Born & Hoing, supra note 25, at 403; Gary B.
Born, The Hague Evidence Convention Revisite& Reflections on Its Role in U.S. Civil
Procedure, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs., Summer 1994, at 77, 77; Buxbaum, supra note 2, at
87-88; James Chalmers, The Hague Evidence Convention and Discovery Inter Partes: Trial
Court Decisions Post-A6rospatiale, 8 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 189, 210-14 (2000); Iontcheva, supranote 2, at 890-91.
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before the Supreme Court's intervention in Ae'rospatiale, the federal courts did
164
And since
apply the Convention to interparty disputes at least occasionally.
Aerospatiale, while eschewing the Convention in interparty disputes, judges
continue to require use of the Convention when litigants seek discovery from
foreign nonparties, even (albeit more rarely) when the nonparty is within the
5
court's personal jurisdiction and thus its power of compulsion.16
A review of these available decisions suggests that the consistency of the
federal courts' rejection of the Evidence Convention post-Ae'rospatialeis due to
the accretion of parochial pressures. One would be hard pressed to recognize in
the most recent decisions the broad discretion carved out by the Supreme
Court in Aerospatiale. Instead, judges apply one of two rubrics-a tripartite
standard or a multifactor balancing test, both derived from dicta in
Aerospatiale-in a manner that has become rote through miscalibration and
ossification.
In their initial attempts to apply Ae'rospatiale, federal judges turned to the
opinion's most precise articulation of the interests to be balanced: the Court's
admonition that judges should consider "the particular facts, sovereign
interests, and likelihood that resort to [the Evidence Convention] procedures
will prove effective." 16 Indeed, two circuit courts-the Fifth Circuit and the
67
Third Circuit-explicitly adopted this tripartite standard as the relevant test.'
These three factors, however, do not mean much-except that the facts of
Aerospatiale were not enough to tip the balance. And because courts assumed
that the party invoking the Convention should bear the burden of proof (a
68
question not directly addressed by the AerospatialeCourt), the unintelligibility of the factors has weighed against the Convention's applicability.

164. See, e.g., S & S Screw Mach. Co. v. Cosa Corp., 647 F. Supp. 600, 613-18 (M.D. Tenn. 1986)

(reasoning that the Evidence Convention does not displace the Federal Rules but that
parties must nevertheless use its procedures initially as a matter of comity); Phila. Gear

Corp. v. Am. Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58, 61 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("[TIhe proper exercise of

judicial restraint requires that the avenue of first resort for plaintiff be the Hague
Convention."); see also George A. Bermann, The Hague Evidence Convention in the Supreme
Court A Critique of the A6rospatiale Decision, 63 TUL. L. REV. 525, 536 n.38 (1989)
(collecting district and state court cases).

165. See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, No. 10 Civ. 9471(KPF)(HBP), 2015 WL 3701602,

at "I1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2015) (summarizing the procedural history of the use of the
Evidence Convention in that case); CE Intl Res. Holdings v. S.A. Minerals Ltd. P'ship,

No. 12-CV-08087 (CM)(SN), 2013 WL 2661037, at *10-14 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013);
SEC v. Stanford Int'l Bank, Ltd., 776 F. Supp. 2d 323, 340, 342 (N.D. Tex. 2011); see also
Nafziger, supra note 134, at 110 & n.51 (collecting additional cases).

166. Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 544 (1987).
167. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288, 300 (3d Cir. 2004); In re

Anschuetz & Co., 838 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).

168. See Born & Hoing, supranote 25, at 401-02.
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For example, taking the last factor first, it is unclear what would establish
the Evidence Convention's "effectiveness." A court might ask simply whether
the Convention would allow the requesting party to obtain most of the desired
discovery. But the Court in Ae'rospatiale seemed to suggest that getting some
evidence through Convention procedures was not enough.1 69 So courts
coalesced instead around a more comparative analysis, inquiring whether the
Convention procedures would be as effective as the Federal Rules, or perhaps
whether they would be more effective. 7 0 In the late 1980s and early 1990s,
before the advent of the World Wide Web, U.S. courts did not have access to
data about the Convention's global application that would allow them to
answer that question.17' Instead, judges typically relied on Ae'rospatiales
unsupported assertion that the Convention procedures would be "unduly time
consuming and expensive"1 72 and concluded that this factor favored
application of the Federal Rules.1 73 Soon, even when the party invoking the
Convention could point to indications of efficiency or effectiveness, the
consistency of prior opinions combined with the burden of proof made this
default assumption impossible to overcome.174 Further, for some judges, this
169. See Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 542 (rejecting a rule of first resort to the Evidence
Convention procedures because they would often be "less certain to produce needed
evidence than direct use of the Federal Rules").

170. See Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 657 F. Supp. 2d 525, 531 (D.NJ. 2009)

(noting that a deposition taken under the Evidence Convention would not use the same
procedures as a deposition taken under the Federal Rules); In re Aircrash Disaster near
Roselawn, 172 F.RD. 295, 308 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (finding that discovery under the
Convention would not be more effective than discovery under the Federal Rules);

Rich v. KIS Cal., Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 258 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (noting that the defendants

failed to show that discovery under the Convention would be more effective than
discovery under the Federal Rules).
171. Today the Hague Conference's website does provide judges some access to information
about the Evidence Convention's efficiency, albeit based on volunteer survey data from
member states. See Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil
or Commercial Matters Questionnaires& Responses, HCCH, https://www.hcch.net/en/
instruments/conventions/publications/?dtid=33&cid=82 (last visited Apr. 4, 2017).
Because this factor has already ossified, however, new information is unlikely to shift
the weight of precedent that has concluded the Convention is never sufficiently
effective.
172. Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 542.
173. See, e.g., In re Aircrash Disaster, 172 F.R.D. at 310; see also MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Rexam

PLC, No. 1:10cv511 (GBL/TRJ), 2010 WL 5574325, at *2 (E.D. Va. Dec. 14, 2010)
(gathering cases to similar effect).

174. See Autodesk, Inc. v. ZWCAD Software Co., No. 5:14-cv-01409-EJD, 2015 WL 1928184,
at '6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2015) (rejecting evidence that China would honor requests for
assistance because the resulting discovery might not be sufficiently broad); Schindler
Elevator, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 530 (rejecting as inadequate the Swiss government's
submission that a deposition could be completed in Switzerland within two months);

Doster v. Schenk A.G., 141 F.R.D. 50, 54 nn.6-7 (M.D.N.C. 1991) (invoking the burden of

footnote continued on next page
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ossified factor alone was enough to reject recourse to the Convention because
they assumed that the three factors were all necessary conditions. 175
For those judges who instead treated the factors as a balancing test (more
likely the Court's intention, if it had one), the "particular facts" factor likewise
quickly ossified to favor the Federal Rules. The Supreme Court had not
suggested what the relevant "particular facts" of a case would be; based on the
concerns that seemed to animate Ae'rospatiale, judges simplified this factor to
17 6
This inquiry
whether the requested discovery was unduly "intrusive."
tailored,
narrowly
and
relevant
became circular: if the requested discovery was
77
If, on
Rules.'
it was not unduly intrusive, and the factor favored the Federal
the other hand, a discovery request was intrusive (that is, overbroad, irrelevant,
or excessive), the Federal Rules could be used to winnow it down, at least
theoretically, until it was no longer intrusive-at which point the factor again
178
favored proceeding under the Federal Rules.
That left the "sovereign interests" factor, which fared little better. Courts
relied heavily on the Supreme Court's dismissive treatment of the French
blocking statute in Ae'rospatiale, extending it (by imperfect analogy) to other
79
states' laws that conflicted with broad U.S. discovery practices.1 Judges also
discounted other countries' interests in controlling the collection of evidence
proof in finding that the defendant failed to establish effectiveness); Benton Graphics v.

Uddeholm Corp., 118 F.R.D. 386, 391 (D.N.J. 1987) (finding insufficient a submission

that Sweden could process a discovery request in approximately two months).
175. See, e.g., Benton Graphics, 118 F.R.D. at 389.
176. See, e.g., Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp., No. 89 C 1971, 1990

WL 147066, at 41-2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 1990); Rich v. KIS Cal., Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 257
(M.D.N.C. 1988).

177. See Rich, 121 F.R.D. at 257.
178. See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d 45, 52 & n.10 (D.D.C. 2000) (collecting
cases taking this approach); Benton Graphics, 118 F.R.D. at 390-91; Bedford Comput.
Corp. v. Isr. Aircraft Indus. Ltd. (In re Bedford Comput. Corp.), 114 B.R. 2, 6 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1990) (adopting the reasoning of Rich "except that the totality of discovery
sought in this case is too extensive, unnecessary and intrusive" and concluding that
"[tihe solution is to limit the discovery sought, and still use the F.R.C.P."); see also Doster,
141 F.R.D. at 53 (noting that because requests could be narrowed through a discovery
conference, the defendant "loses the right to urge use of the Hague Convention" when
the defendant "fail[s] to take advantage of the discovery conference procedure").

179. See, e.g., AccessData Corp. v. ALSTE Techs. GmbH, No. 2:08cv569, 2010 WL 318477, at

*2 (D. Utah Jan. 21, 2010); In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., No. 2:06-CV-1732-LDD, 2008
WL 2275531, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 13, 2008); Rich, 121 F.R.D. at 258 ("In general, broad
blocking statutes, including those which purport to impose criminal sanctions, which
have such extraordinary extraterritorial effect, do not warrant much deference."). But
see In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., No. 99-197TFH, 2001 WL 1049433, at *4-5, '9-10
(D.D.C. June 20, 2001) (refusing to require the.plaintiffs to seek discovery through the
Evidence Convention but allowing the defendants to produce privilege logs identifying documents for which disclosure might violate German or Swiss privacy laws).
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in their own territory and any other phrasing of sovereign interests that could
arguably be reflected in the Evidence Convention itself. If such interests would
be sufficient, judges reasoned, "then there would be an automatic finding of an
'important sovereign interest' in every case," and "[slurely the Supreme Court
did not intend [such a] result when it announced that the presence of an
overriding sovereign interest was one of the factors to weigh in the resolution
of these cases." 180 In other words, because the general sovereign interests of
France were insufficient in Airospatiale, something more was required to tip
the balance to favor the Convention-even though the Convention already
represents a balancing of sovereign interests struck by the political
branches.18' Foreign parties were hard pressed to identify that something
more, given that all statutes regarding discovery, privacy, and disclosure, as
well as national legal traditions and the Convention itself, were presumptively
insufficient.
The tripartite standard, although ambiguous and poorly designed, is not
itself inherently biased against foreign interests, foreign litigants, or the
invocation of the Evidence Convention. Notably, two early opinions did try to
calibrate the test differently and avoid ossification pressures.1 82 In requiring
parties to use the Convention, these two judges emphasized the need to be
sensitive to foreign and systemic interests over case management concerns.183
They also questioned the assumption that the Convention procedures were
inadequate, reasoning instead that "the major obstacle to the effective use of the
Convention procedures, if one there be, is litigants' lack of familiarity with
them." 184 To simply assume the procedures' ineffectiveness, they reasoned,
180. Great Lakes, 1990 WL 147066, at '2; see also Benton Graphics, 118 F.R.D. at 391
(discounting the Swedish government's intervention because the sovereign interests
expressed by Sweden were "merely general reasons why Sweden prefers civil law
discovery procedures to the more liberal discovery permitted under the federal rules").
181. See Buxbaum, supranote 2, at 94-95.
182. See In re Perrier Bottled Water Litig., 138 F.R.D. 348 (D. Conn. 1991); Hudson v.

Hermann Pfauter GmbH & Co., 117 F.R.D. 33 (N.D.N.Y. 1987).

183. See In re Perrier, 138 F.R.D. at 355 ("The simple fact that, in joining the Convention,
France has consented to its procedures is an expression of France's sovereign interests
and weighs heavily in favor of the use of these procedures."); Hudson, 117 F.R.D. at 37-39
(relying on Justice Blackmun's opinion in Aerospatialein emphasizing West Germany's
interest in its territorial integrity, its constitutional principles of privacy, and systemic
concerns for reciprocity); see also In re Anschuetz & Co., 838 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir.
1988) (per curiam) (emphasizing that "the district court should consider, with due
caution, that many foreign countries, particularly civil law countries, do not subscribe
to our open-ended views regarding pretrial discovery, and in some cases may even be
offended by our pretrial procedures," and stressing the interests of the international
system and foreign states as embodied in the Evidence Convention and endorsed by the
political branches).
184. In re Perrier,138 F.R.D. at 355.
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'would reflect the same parochial biases that the Convention was designed to
overcome." 185
But these two district court opinions quickly became marginalized. Why?
The key reason, I propose, was the power of the particular. First, most early
decisions approached the problem from the perspective of the parties, not of
the foreign states.186 Approaching the question through the lens of party
interests understandably led courts to emphasize concerns like delay, cost,
fairness, and the availability of traditional tools for managing discovery, which
obscured the broader systemic interests at stake. Second, it might not be a
coincidence that these two opinions, as well as two other early opinions that
invoked the Evidence Convention, were the only four decisions during the
decade following Ae'rospatialethat were authored by district court judges; all the
187
This is not to
other available decisions were written by magistrate judges.
III peers
Article
their
than
cosmopolitan
less
are
judges
magistrate
suggest that
case-specific
narrower
even
an
within
but rather that they tend to operate
scope: the management of pretrial discovery. Third, some of these early
188
Judges
magistrate decisions might be examples of cases making bad law.
could not overlook the equities when the parties invoking the Convention had
already used the Federal Rules when doing so had served their interests, had
refused to confer with opposing counsel, or had reneged on prior discovery
agreements.189 It is not that these individual cases were wrongly decided but
rather that their language and reasoning were then applied more broadly to
cases that might have had very different equities.
Thus, within ten years of Ae'rospatiale, the weight of district court precedent shaped a standard trajectory of analysis under the tripartite standard:
185. Hudson, 117 F.R.D. at 38-39.

186. See Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm Corp., 118 F.R.D. 386, 389 n.2 (D.N.J. 1987) ("In
Aerospatiale, the majority did not elevate theoretical policy concerns over the effect
Convention procedures would have upon particular litigants. Rather, the Court
specifically directed district courts to analyze the interests of the parties and the
intrusiveness of the discovery sought.").

187. See Jenco v. Martech Int'l, Inc., CIV. A. No. 86-4229, 1988 WL 44442, at "1 (E.D. La.
Apr. 29, 1988) (denying the defendant's request for jurisdictional discovery to proceed
under the Evidence Convention), rev'd in part, CIV. A. No. 86-4229, 1988 WL 54733, at
*1 (E.D. La. May 19, 1988) (ordering discovery to proceed under the Convention).
188. See generally Schauer, supra note 10 (considering how the concrete facts of a particular
case can distort a judge's ability to predict the full range of future cases that may be
affected by his ruling).
189. See, e.g., Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp., No. 89 C 1971, 1990

WL 147066, at "2-3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 1990); Rich v. KIS Cal., Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 257-58
(M.D.N.C. 1988); Haynes v. Kleinwefers, 119 F.R.D. 335, 337-38 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); cf
Hudson, 117 F.R.D. at 34, 35 & n.2 (requiring use of the Evidence Convention where the
invoking party had raised its request early and agreed to provide some discovery under
the Federal Rules and where the opposing party's discovery requests were excessive).
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opinions invoked the two ossified factors of the Evidence Convention's
ineffectiveness and the lack of sufficient foreign sovereign interests, and then
they managed away any overbreadth in the discovery request until the
"particular facts" factor was also satisfied. 90 The two outlier cases were
distinguished at first in passing and then not at all. 19 1
Nonetheless, some judges were uneasy; they recognized that Aerospatiale's
tripartite test "is an obtuse, difficult-to-apply standard" for which parties could
not provide adequate evidence. 192 Perhaps because this tripartite standard
provided so little real guidance, by the early 2000s judges were invoking a more
detailed multifactor test. 193 That test derives from a set of factors mentioned in

190. See, e.g., MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Rexam PLC, No. 1:10cv511 (GBL/TRJ), 2010 WL

5574325, at '1-2 (E.D. Va. Dec. 14, 2010) (refusing to determine whether the discovery
was excessive because the parties met and conferred to narrow it, discounting the
French government's submission and French blocking statute based on prior opinions,
and citing prior opinions in asserting that Evidence Convention procedures would be
needlessly cumbersome), affd mem., No. 1:10cv511, 2011 WL 102675 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10,
2011); In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., No. 2:06-CV-1732-LDD, 2008 WL 2275531, at -"4
(E.D. Pa. May 13, 2008) (reasoning that intrusive discovery can be tempered through
protective orders under the Federal Rules and relying on Aerospatialeto both discount
the Swiss blocking statute and conclude that the Evidence Convention procedures
would be ineffective); Hagenbuch v. 3B6 Sistemi Elettronici Industriali S.R.L., No. 04 C
3109, 2005 WL 6246195, at "3-5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2005) (reasoning that the discovery
was not intrusive because the plaintiff was entitled to it, that Italy's interest in
restricting pretrial discovery was an insufficient sovereign interest "as such an
outcome would result in finding an important sovereign interest in every case," and
that-based primarily on a citation to Airospatiale-use of the Evidence Convention
"may be difficult and time consuming"); Valois of Am., Inc. v. Risdon Corp., 183 F.R.D.
344, 346-47, 349 (D. Conn. 1997) (citing precedent to establish the ossified factors and
concluding that counsel could confer about narrowing the otherwise intrusive
discovery requests before holding that the Evidence Convention need not be used at

that time); see also Madden v. Wyeth, No. 3-03-CV-0167-BD, 2006 WL 7284528, at *2

(N.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2006) ("[T]his court agrees with the well-reasoned decisions of other
federal courts refusing to give substantial deference to France's preference for the
Hague Convention, as expressed in its 'blocking statute,' and recognizing that discovery
procedures under the Convention are far more cumbersome than under the federal
rules.").
191. Compare In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d 45, 51 (D.D.C. 2000) (disagreeing
with Hudson), and Valois, 183 F.R.D. at 346-49 (discussing Hudson and In re Perrierand
attempting to reconcile them with the other post-Ae'rospatiale case law), with
MeadWestvaco, 2010 WL 5574325, at 12 (using In re Perrieras support for the proposition that the Evidence Convention is cumbersome and inefficient), and In re Aspartame,
2008 WL 2275531, at "4 (referring to In re Perrier'sacknowledgment that most courts
have rejected use of the Convention).
192. See, e.g., Adams v. Unione Mediterranea di Sicurta, No. Civ.A. 94-1954, 2002 WL 472252,

at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2002).

193. See, e.g., id. at 13.
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an Aerospatiale footnote, 194 which were in turn drawn from a draft of the
195
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Those five
factors, as listed in Aerospatiale, are
(1) the importance to the ... litigation of the documents or other information
requested; (2) the degree of specificity of the request; (3) whether the information
originated in the United States; (4) the availability of alternative means of
securing the information; and (5) the extent to which noncompliance with the
request would undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance
with the request would undermine important interests of the state where the
19 6
information is located.

But this multifactor test also fell prey to the same evolutionary tendencies.
First, the multifactor test, though appealing in its crisper detail, was still
not a good fit for determining when to invoke the Evidence Convention. It was
drawn from a section in the Restatement (Third) meant to help judges decide
whether and to what extent to order parties to turn over documents located in
another country, particularly when there is a conflict with that country's law
(answer: cautiously and narrowly). That decision overlaps with, but is distinct
from, the choice between applying the Federal Rules or the Convention to
1
manage transnational discovery. 97
194. Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 544 n.28
(1987) (noting that this set of factors "suggested" the "nature of the concerns that guide a
comity analysis").
195. These factors were later codified in the Restatement (Third). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442(1)(c) (AM. LAW. INST.
1987). For an example of a court applying these factors, see In re Air Cargo Shipping
Servs. Antitrust Litig., 278 F.R.D. 51, 52-54 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). A minority of judges have
invoked similar factors from the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States that were used in Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 116 F.R.D.
517, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), a case about foreign discovery that did not actually involve the
Evidence Convention, id. at 519. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). Most notably, the
Second Circuit approved the Minpeco factors for application in Convention disputes in
First American Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16, 22 (2d Cir. 1998). These factors
are:
(i) the competing interests of the nations whose laws are in conflict; (ii) the hardship that
compliance would impose on the party or witness from whom discovery is sought; (iii) the
importance to the litigation of the information and documents requested; and ([iv]) the good
faith of the party resisting discovery.

Id.
196. Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.28 (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 437(1)(c) (AM. LAW
INST., Tentative Draft No.7, 1986)).
197. Indeed, the factors cited in Adrospatialewere eventually codified at section 442, while
the Restatement (Third) explicitly addresses the applicability of the Evidence Convention at section 473. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 473 & cmt. i, with id. § 442(c). The Minpeco factors are an even
more imperfect fit, as they were drawn from a test for resolving conflicts of enforcefootnote continued on next page
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Unsurprisingly, given this imperfect fit, the factors from the Restatement
(Third) were, in practice, simplified and ossified much along the same lines as
the tripartite standard. Take, for example, the consideration of "the degree of
specificity of the request." 98 As with the "particular facts" factor from the
tripartite standard, courts have concluded that this factor weighs in favor of
applying the Federal Rules both when requests are specific'9 and when they
are not.200 Likewise, the "availability of alternative means of securing the
information" factor 201 is ambiguous. Judges have considered whether
substantially similar information could be obtained domestically, 202 for
example, or whether discovery could be obtained as efficiently under the
Evidence Convention. 203 For courts that took the latter route, the question of
efficiency quickly ossified against application of the Convention for the same
reasons it had under the tripartite standard. 204
Second, in adding more factors for courts to consider, the multifactor test
only increased the salience of case management considerations, which will
often favor the application of the more familiar Federal Rules. Under the
tripartite standard, foreign sovereign interests are weighed against two case
ment jurisdiction more generally. Minpeco, 116 F.R.D. at 522 (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40). Some of those
factors-like "the extent to which enforcement [of a state's laws] by action of either
state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that
state," id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 40(e))-simply do not translate to the discovery context.
198. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS

LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 442(1)(c).
199. See, e.g., Milliken & Co. v. Bank of China, 758 F. Supp. 2d 238, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re
Air Cargo Shipping Servs., 278 F.R.D. at 53.
200. See Tansey v. Cochlear Ltd., No. 13-CV-4628 (SJF)(SIL), 2014 WL 4676588, at "3
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2014) (finding the discovery requests insufficiently specific for the
Evidence Convention yet sufficiently specific for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure);
Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 910 F. Supp. 2d 548, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ("At present, the
lack of specificity of some of plaintiffs' discovery requests weighs against granting
plaintiffs' motion. But once plaintiffs' discovery requests have been narrowed .... the
specificity factor will weigh in plaintiffs' favor as well.").
201. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 442(1)(c).
202. Pershing Pac. W., LLC v. MarineMax, Inc., No. 10-cv-1345-L (DHB), 2013 WL 941617,
at '8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013), amended by No. 10cv1345-L (DHB), 2013 WL 1628938 (S.D.
Cal. Apr. 16, 2013).
203. See Milliken, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 247-48; In reAir Cargo Shipping Servs., 278 F.R.D. at 53.

204. See, e.g., TruePosition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co., No. 11-4574, 2012 WL 707012, at '5
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2012); see also In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs., 278 F.R.D. at 53 ("[TIhe
outcome of a request pursuant to the Convention is by no means certain, and making
the request will undeniably result in delays of unknown, and perhaps considerable,
duration.").
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management factors. But under the multifactor test, depending on how it is
articulated, foreign sovereign interests are weighed against four to six case
management factors. 205 If the case management factors point toward the
Federal Rules, as they are prone to do, it is nearly impossible for one factor
related to sovereign interests to tip the balance back toward the Evidence
Convention.
Third, the lone sovereign interest factor again ossified and generalized
over time. Under the Restatement (Third) approach, the weighing of sovereign
interests is meant to incorporate the U.S. interest in reciprocity with other
nations.206 But given that courts are not well positioned to account for such
systemic interests as part of a case-specific analysis, the Restatement (Third)
commentary's gloss has been lost in practice. In weighing this factor, courts
have instead emphasized purely domestic U.S. interests, phrased in increasingly
generic terms, that would apply to all cases: for example, the U.S. interest in
applying its own rules of procedure, 207 or in vindicating the rights of U.S.
2
plaintiffs, 208 or in ensuring full and fair adjudication before U.S. courts. 09
Meanwhile, courts have struggled to identify the relevant foreign interests
on the other side of the scale. The Restatement (Third) commentary urges courts
to look beyond the foreign state's general sovereignty concerns or its
preference for its own style of litigation, focusing instead on the "substantive

205. For example, courts in the Second Circuit combine the Restatement (Third) factors with
additional Minpeco factors: "the hardship of compliance on the party or witness from
whom discovery is sought [and] the good faith of the party resisting discovery." E.g.,

Strauss II, 249 F.R.D. 429, 439 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Minpeco,
S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). Courts in the
Ninth Circuit consider as additional factors "the hardship that inconsistent enforcement would impose" on the objecting party and the likelihood that such enforcement
would "achieve compliance" with local laws. See, e.g., St. Jude Med. S.C. v. JanssenCounotte, 104 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1161 (D. Or. 2015) (quoting Richmark Corp. v. Timber

Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1475 (9th Cir. 1992)).
206. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442

cmt. c (advising courts to weigh "the long-torm [sic] interests of the United States
generally in international cooperation in law enforcement and judicial assistance, in
joint approach to problems of common concern, in giving effect to formal or informal
international agreements, and in orderly international relations").

207. Tansey v. Cochlear Ltd., No. 13-CV-4628 (SJF)(SIL), 2014 WL 4676588, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 18, 2014).

208. Pershing Pac. W., LLC v. MarineMax, Inc., No. 10-cv-1345-L (DHB), 2013 WL 941617,
at '8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013).
209. Milliken & Co. v. Bank of China, 758 F. Supp. 2d 238, 248-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(recognizing, however, that this broad interest is less weighty than more policyspecific interests); In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs., 278 F.R.D. at 54; In re Glob. Power

Equip. Grp., 418 B.R.

833, 848 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009).
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policies or interests of the foreign state." 2 10 But it is easier for courts to point to
another state's overarching preferences than to determine specific substantive
policies. Thus, courts typically refer to other states' broad interests in
'controlling access to information within [their] borders" and "affordling] ...
citizens protections against discovery in foreign litigation"-and then discount
these interests as "relatively weak" or too general to be relevant.2 11 Sometimes
judges do identify more specific substantive concerns-like antitrust,
terrorism, or restitution for Holocaust victims-but then assert that the two
states share those concerns. 212 Whether France and the United Kingdom agree
that cartels, terrorists, or Nazis are bad, however, does not mean that they
share an interest in U.S. courts enforcing U.S. causes of action-and U.S.-style
discovery-against European industry or banks. 2 13
And under both rubrics-the tripartite standard as well as the multifactor
balancing test-the assumption that foreign blocking statutes are merely
symbolic is now so engrained that new information cannot dislodge it. For
example, U.S. courts long refused to take the French blocking statute seriously
because its criminal provisions were never enforced.21 4 Then, in 2007, France
prosecuted and fined a French attorney under the statute for turning over

210. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442
cmt. c.
211. E.g., In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs., 278 F.R.D. at 54-55; see also Burke, supranote 76, at 910 (critiquing district courts' discounting of foreign states' judicial sovereignty
concerns); Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 93-95 (doing the same).

212. See, e.g., In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288, 304 (3d Cir. 2004)
("[T]here is no reason to assume that discovery under the Federal Rules would
inevitably offend Germany's sovereign interest because presumably Germany, like the
United States, would prohibit the alleged price-fixing conspiracy and would welcome
investigation of such antitrust violation to the fullest extent."); In re Air Cargo Shipping
Servs., 278 F.R.D. at 54 ("[T]his is a case involving violations of antitrust laws whose
enforcement is essential to the country's interests in a competitive economy .... The
interest in prohibiting price-fixing of the type alleged here is shared by France ... .);
Strauss I, 242 F.R.D. 199, 213-14 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (concluding that the "mutual interests of
the United States and France in combating terrorism outweigh the French interest, if
any, regarding the disputed discovery" (italics omitted)); Bodner v. Paribas, 202 F.R.D.
370, 375-77 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (asserting that "the goals of the [Holocaust victim] plaintiffs
in this case clearly are consistent with the objectives of the French Government"
despite interventions from the French government calling for use of the Evidence
Convention).
213. Indeed, the transnational reach of U.S. antitrust and financial regulation has been a
source of friction with European allies since the 1940s. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra
note 46, at 680-82.
214. See, e.g., Bodner, 202 F.R.D. at 375 ("As held by numerous courts, the French Blocking
Statute does not subject defendants to a realistic risk of prosecution... ."); In re Aircrash
Disaster near Roselawn, 172 F.R.D. 295, 310 (N.D. 111. 1997); see also Strauss I, 242 F.R.D.
at 220-21 (collecting cases "refus[ing] to give effect to the French blocking statute").
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documents in a U.S. proceeding. 2 15 Now U.S. courts do not take the French
blocking statute seriously because it has only ever been enforced once.2 16 And
the courts' skepticism of the French blocking statute continues to spill over to
other states' statutes that embody more specific policy concerns, like the
protection of data privacy or bank secrecy. 2 17
Twice judges have attempted to distill a rubric from the open-endedness of
Aerospatiale. Both times the pull of case management concerns, the difficulty of
assessing sovereign interests (amplified by the Aerospatiale Court's discounting
of the balance of interests already struck by the political branches), and the
draw of oft-repeated dicta to fill in difficult-to-ascertain facts miscalibrated and
ossified the inquiry until one particular result was locked in.218 Given the
weight of precedent, new information cannot dislodge these ossified factors
and even judges approaching the question with an open mind will find
themselves nearly compelled to rule against use of the Evidence Convention.
B.

Forum Non Conveniens

Commentators have heavily criticized the federal courts for undervaluing
the interests of foreign plaintiffs in dismissing cases for forum non

215. See Daniel S. Alterbaum, Comment, Christopher X and CNIL A ClarionCall to Revitalize
the Hague Conventions, 38 YALE J. INTL L. 217, 223-24 (2013) (citing In re Avocat
"Christopher X," Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] Paris,
crim., Dec. 12, 2007, Bull. crim., No. 309 (Fr.)).
216. "[The appellant's] attempt to distinguish well established precedent based on its claim
that French authorities are only now enforcing the statute does not change the
sovereignty considerations underlying the Supreme Court's analysis of the French
blocking statute." SNP Boat Serv. S.A. v. Hotel le St. James, 483 B.R. 776, 787 (S.D. Fla.
2012); see also MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Rexam PLC, No. 1:10cv5ll (GBL/TRJ), 2010 WL

5574325, at 12 & n.1 (E.D. Va. Dec. 14, 2010), affd ment, No. 1:10cv511, 2011 WL 102675
(E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2011); In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs., 278 F.R.D. at 54; Strauss H, 249
F.RD. 429, 450-51 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Glob. Power Equip. Grp., 418 B.R. 833, 849-50
(Bankr. D. Del. 2009). As the Second Circuit has helpfully clarified in another context,
courts should not discount the existence of conflicting foreign laws simply because the
foreign country has not pursued enforcement actions. See In re Vitamin C Antitrust

Litig., 837 F.3d 175, 191-92 (2d Cir. 2016).
217. See Milliken & Co. v. Bank of China, 758 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(discounting China's interest in its bank secrecy laws because the Chinese government
had not specifically intervened and the Chinese criminal law implications were vague);
AccessData Corp. v. ALSTE Techs. GmbH, No. 2:08cv569, 2010 WL 318477, at 42 (D.
Utah Jan. 21, 2010) (citing Aerospatiale to establish that a German data protection law
did not warrant deference); Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 657 F. Supp.
2d 525, 532 (D.N.J. 2009) (discounting the applicability of Swiss law in part due to a lack
of known prosecutions for complying with U.S. court orders).
218. Cf Iontcheva, supra note 2, at 892 (calling for intervention in 2001 "before the district
courts' scattered decisions coalesce into a body of precedent carrying its own force").
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conveniens, 219 a doctrine that allows judges to decline jurisdiction in cases they
believe would be more appropriately heard in another country's courts. 220 In
particular, scholars worry that courts grant motions to dismiss for forum non
conveniens close to 50% of the time.22 1 That rate increases for cases involving
foreign plaintiffs but not for cases involving foreign defendants. 222 This
protectionist tilt in forum non conveniens practice may reflect not the
individual bias of judges, however, as much as the structure of this common
law inquiry. Here again the Supreme Court has emphasized trial court
discretion 223 while transplanting a poorly fitting balancing test from the
domestic context. The combination of poor fit and broad discretion has
encouraged judges to overemphasize local concerns, leading to the test's
miscalibration. 224 Meanwhile, efforts to adapt the test to the transnational
context have only led to ossification and generalization because the added
inquiries exceed judicial capacity. The result is a doctrine that has predictably
come to favor local defendants-the very parties who were traditionally
supposed to benefit least from its protection. 225
In its 1981 decision in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, the Supreme Court
instructed judges to evaluate forum non conveniens motions in transnational
cases through a balancing test that it had created for domestic cases. 226 Under

219. For a partial sampling of an extensive literature, see Davies, supra note 126, at 311-15;
Heiser, supra note 62, at 613-14; Lear, supra note 1, at 561-62; and Joel H. Samuels, When
Is an Alternative Forum Availablet Rethinking the Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 85 IND.

L.J. 1059,1059-60,1111 (2010).
220. Sinochem Intl Co. v. Malay. Intl Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422,425 (2007).
221. See, e.g., Donald Earl Childress III, Forum Conveniens The Searchfor a Convenient Forum in
TransnationalCases, 53 VA.J. INT'L L. 157, 169 (2012) (finding that motions to dismiss for
forum non conveniens in reported federal cases were granted 48% of the time between
2007 and 2012); Samuels, supra note 219, at 1077 n.108 (finding a 41% dismissal rate
among published federal cases between 1982 and 2007); Whytock, supra note 17, at 502
& n.114 (finding a 47% dismissal rate among a random sample of 210 published
decisions by district court judges between 1990 and 2005).
222. See Whytock, supra note 17, at 524-27.

223. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249-50, 257 (1981) ("If central emphasis
were placed on any one factor, the forum non conveniens doctrine would lose much of
the very flexibility that makes it so valuable.").
224. Cf David W. Robertson, The FederalDoctrineof Forum Non Conveniens- "An Object Lesson
in Uncontrolled Discretion," 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 353, 359 (1994) ("A non-exhaustive,
unweighted, and unranked listing of factors does not afford much if any doctrinal
guidance, particularly when virtually every factor on the list is itself somewhat vague
and amorphous." (footnote omitted)).
225. See Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2017) (explaining how forum non conveniens was historically a plea reserved for
defendants who resided outside the forum).

226. 454 U.S. at 257.
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227
that domestic rubric, first articulated in the 1947 case Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
courts weigh a set of public and private interests in having a case tried locally
versus in a sister state. 228 This was not a test designed to help trial judges take
into account the foreign or systemic interests at stake in a transnational case.
Take the test's public interest factors, which focus on administrative
burdens for the local forum. They instruct judges to weigh the congestion of
the court's docket; "the unfairness of burdening citizens ... with jury duty" for
cases "unrelated" to the forum; the "local interest in having localized
controversies decided at home"; and "the avoidance of unnecessary problems in
conflict of laws, or in the application of foreign law," including a preference for
cases being tried by courts "at home with the law that must govern the
action."229 Notably missing from these factors is any explicit consideration of
comity, a key consideration for any transnational case. Nor is it clear where
such comity interests might fit within the test even if individual judges were to
raise them. Indeed, because these public interest factors are framed from the
perspective of administrative difficulties for the local court, they encourage
judges to focus on particularly salient (meaning concrete, pressing, and
immediately perceivable) considerations that will often cut against the courts'
230
background comity obligation of providing fair fora for foreign parties.
These public interest factors are also a poor fit for the transnational
context because the Court in Gilbert had no need to engage in any comparative
inquiry. In Gilbert, the dispute-between a Virginian businessman and a
Pennsylvanian corporation over a warehouse fire in Virginia-had no real

227. 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).
228. Since the adoption of the federal venue transfer statute shortly after Gilbert was
decided, federal judges can simply transfer cases-they believe would be more appropriately heard in another U.S. state. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2015). Forum non conveniens is
thus used by federal courts today primarily in the context of transnational litigation,
where the alternative forum is not another state but another country. See Am.

Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443,449 n.2 (1994).
229. Piper,454 U.S. at 241 n.6 (quoting Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 509).
230. "It was long settled that neither foreign citizens nor foreign residents were barred from
access to U.S. courts, including in actions arising abroad under foreign law. This rule
rested on principles of international law, and was uniformly acknowledged by
commentators." BORN & RUTLEDGE, supranote 46, at 366; see also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466, 484 (2004) ("The courts of the United States have traditionally been open to
nonresident aliens."); Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570, 578 (1908) ("Alien
citizens, by the policy and practice of the courts of this country, are ordinarily
permitted to resort to the courts for the redress of wrongs and the protection of their
rights."). Commentators have thus argued that the greater comity risk with forum non
conveniens comes not from the retention of transnational cases but from the dismissal
in particular of cases involving foreign plaintiffs and U.S. defendants. See, e.g., Lear,
supranote 1, at 563; Whytock & Robertson, supranote 68, at 1491-92.
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connection to the state of New York, where the suit was brought. 231 Any
alternative forum with some nexus to the parties or the harm would have been
more appropriate in terms of judicial administration. But for most
transnational cases, the parties, evidence, or harms will stretch across multiple
countries, including the United States. Gilbert's factors do not help judges
choose among those possible fora. Should jury duty be imposed on a
community that has some relation to the litigation? 232 What if the dispute is
not "localized" within a single other jurisdiction or if the persons affected do
not all live in one place? 233 Nor does the Gilbert test guide judges to consider
whether a trial in the foreign forum will in fact resolve the defendant's
concerns. In Gilbert, the alternative forum was another federal district court
that would apply equivalent procedures, but the procedures of a foreign forum
will necessarily differ. 234 In short, the public interest factors only help judges
consider how this forum will hurt the defendant's interests. It does not help
judges weigh the two fora's comparative interests in the case or consider
whether the alternative forum will in fact solve any identified shortcomings or
further the interests of justice. As a result, the transplanted test is miscalibrated
from the outset to favor local administrative interests over systemic concerns
about international comity.
Gilberts private interest factors likewise encourage miscalibration. They
direct judges to consider the ease of obtaining evidence, the availability of
compulsory attendance of witnesses, and the option for a view of the premises,
as well as "all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive." 235 Not only do these factors focus judges'
attention on an already salient concern (access to evidence), but that concern is
also of decreasing relevance in the modern era. Indeed, the Gilberttest's focus on
access to evidence is outdated, predating rounds of amendments to the Federal
231. 330 U.S. at 502-03. Similarly, Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.,
decided the same day as Gilbert, was a derivative action brought on behalf of an Illinois
corporation against an Illinois citizen and another Illinois corporation. 330 U.S. 518,
519-20, 522-23 (1947). Though the case was raised by a New York shareholder in a New
York-based court, that nominal plaintiff was just one of many spread across the
country, all with equal claim against the alleged wrongdoing. See id. at 519, 523-26.
232. See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09 ("Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon
the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation." (emphasis added)).
233. See id. at 509 (noting that "[tihere is a local interest in having localized controversies
decided at home" and that when cases "touch the affairs of many persons, there is
reason for holding the trial in their view and reach").
234. See Davies, supra note 126, at 384 (noting that the Gilbert factors presuppose "the
interdistrict, intra-American context in which Gilbert and Koster were decided," which
is not applicable in transnational cases).

235. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 & n.6 (1981) (quoting Gilbert 330 U.S. at
508).
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Rules that make long-distance evidence collection and the preservation of
236
The district courts' lack of experience with
witness testimony much easier.
the Evidence Convention has also led some judges to discount the Convention
as a tool for obtaining evidence or the testimony of witnesses located in other
countries. 237 As a result, courts applying the Gilbert test treat the location of
evidence or nonparty witnesses abroad as a greater obstacle than is warranted.
Even if judges sometimes recognize that evidence gathering in transnational cases is getting easier, 238 Gilberts framing of the private interest factors
still requires judges to evaluate evidentiary concerns first and foremost. That
focus will tend to favor defendants, particularly U.S. defendants worried about
obtaining evidence from other countries. To see why, consider that at the
outset of a case, it is difficult (if not impossible) to forecast what evidence will
239
Most
be critical to establishing, or defending against, nascent claims.
be
may
defendants will thus be able to point to some evidence abroad that
relevant for their defense. Judges can presume that plaintiffs, in choosing the
forum, have already taken into account the difficulty of obtaining evidence
from abroad, but they may harbor due process concerns for defendants who
claim they need access to foreign evidence.
Further, it is hard for judges to forecast whether the alternative foreign
forum will resolve the defendants' evidentiary concerns: given that U.S.
2 0
discovery practices remain the broadest in the world, 4 it is a challenge for
U.S. judges to evaluate (or perhaps even imagine) whether the foreign court's
jurisdiction over evidence will actually translate into party access. Though
judges do at times acknowledge that foreign courts may have similar
241
judges
difficulties gathering evidence scattered across several countries,
236. See Davies, supra note 126, at 324-46.
237. See, e.g., Warrick v. Carnival Corp., No. 12-61389-CIV, 2013 WL 3333358, at 47 (S.D. Fla.
Feb. 4, 2013); In re Air Crash at Madrid, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1032 (C.D. Cal.), amended by
No. 2:10-ml-02135 GAF (RZx), 2011 WL 2183972 (C.D. Cal. May 16,2011), affd sub nom.
Fortaner v. Boeing Co., 504 F. App'x 573 (9th Cir. 2013); Mastafa v. Austl. Wheat Bd.
Ltd., No.07 Civ. 7955(GEL), 2008 WL 4378443, at -'8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2008).
238. See, e.g., Reid-Walen v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390, 1397 (8th Cir. 1991).
239. This is not for lack of trying, however. The Eleventh Circuit, for example, has directed
district courts to undertake a three-stage "private interest" analysis for each cause of
action: the court should identify the elements of the cause of action, "consider the
necessary evidence required to prove and disprove each element," and then "make a
reasoned assessment as to the likely location of such proof." Ford v. Brown, 319 F.3d
1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003). In application, this staged analysis takes up a lot of room but
appears to provide little additional benefit. See, e.g., Warrick, 2013 WL 3333358, at *'4-9.
240. Cf BoRN & RuTLEDGE, supra note 46, at 969-70 (describing narrower conceptions of
discovery in other countries).
241. See, e.g., Baxter Int'l Inc. v. AXA Versicherung AG, 908 F. Supp. 2d 920, 926 (N.D. Ill.
2012); Klyszcz v. Cloward H20 LLC, No. 11-23023-Civ., 2012 WL 4468345, at "4 (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 26, 2012); In re Air Crash, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 1033 ("[N]o matter where these
footnote continued on next page
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typically rely on defendant stipulations that they will provide U.S.-style
discovery to plaintiffs before foreign courts. 242 This again favors dismissal, yet
it is uncertain whether such stipulations are enforceable, at least as a practical
matter.243
In sum, the poorly fitting public and private interest factors from Gilbert
tend to overfavor the interests of defendants, particularly U.S. defendants,
while failing to account for systemic interests like comity. To this mismatched
domestic test, Piper added two threshold glosses to try to account for the
transnational context. First, the Court directed judges to ensure that there is an
adequate and available alternative forum in another country, one that has
jurisdiction to hear the case and the ability to provide some relief, even if
significantly circumscribed. 244 Second, the Court reaffirmed Gilberts "strong
presumption in favor of the plaintiffs choice of forum," but only if the plaintiff
is a U.S. citizen or resident; a foreign plaintiffs choice of forum is entitled to
less deference. 245 Rather than improve the fit of forum non conveniens to
transnational cases, however, these glosses only increased parochial pressures
within the doctrine.
At first glance, Piper'srequirement of an adequate and available alternative
forum would seem to counteract the skew of the Gilbert test by ensuring that
plaintiffs will not be left without a viable forum. But that inquiry has proven
too complex to be practical, with the result that foreign fora are almost never
found to be either inadequate or unavailable. 246 This is not particularly
surprising. Piper discouraged courts from inquiring too deeply into the
question of adequacy, 247 recognizing that such questions would strain judicial
capacity 248: How should a court determine whether a foreign court is unfair or
suits are tried, one side will face difficulty in gathering evidence and presenting
witnesses for its case... . In either situation, the out-of-country evidence will be central
to one party's case.").

242. See, e.g., Tazoe v. Airbus SA.S., 631 F.3d 1321, 1330 (11th Cir. 2011); Giglio Sub S.N.C. v.
Carnival Corp., No. 12-21680-CIV, 2012 WL 4477504, at *16-17 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2012).
243. See Thomas Orin Main, Toward a Law of "Lovely Parting Gifts" Conditioning Forum Non
Conveniens Dismissals, 18 Sw.J.INTL L. 475, 479 (2012).

244. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241, 254 & n.22 (1981). The relief available
in the alternative forum is considered sufficient unless it "is so clearly inadequate or
unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all." Id. at 254.

245. Id. at 255-56.
246. See, e.g., Heiser, supra note 1, at 1172-73; Whytock & Robertson, supra note 68, at 145760. For a thorough discussion of the shortcomings in courts' analyses of the adequate
and available alternative forum requirement, see Samuels, supra note 219.
247. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 251; see also id. at 254 n.22 (emphasizing the high bar of the adequate
and available alternative forum inquiry).
248. See Kevin M. Clermont, The Story of Piper: Forum Matters, in CIVIL PROCEDURE
STORIES,
supra note 40, at 199, 214 (noting that Justices Marshall and Rehnquist chose a high bar
footnote continued on next page
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249
And
whether the remedies available from the foreign court are inadequate?

if the court does think its foreign peer is unfair and its law inadequate, how
250
could it say as much without causing offense?
Instead, courts have avoided this awkward inquiry through two moves,
one addressing the adequacy requirement and the other addressing the
requirement of availability. Both swap an institutionally challenging inquiry
for an easier heuristic. First, courts have set a high bar for finding another
country's courts to be inadequate and then relied on prior decisions' findings of
foreign court adequacy, leading to a self-reinforcing cycle based largely on
25 1
When in doubt, courts have relied
judges' intuitions about other countries.
provide extra discovery to the
will
they
that
on defendant stipulations
forum might typically require,
the
what
plaintiffs in the foreign forum, beyond
or that they will agree to the enforcement of any resulting judgment in the
United States.252 Second and similarly, courts avoid assessing the availability of
foreign fora by relying instead on defendant waivers regarding personal

for this inquiry to help judges avoid becoming mired in complex and sensitive
evaluations of foreign legal systems).
249. Indeed, courts may bend over backwards to avoid such determinations. See, e.g., Harp v.

Airblue Ltd., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (finding the plaintiffs evidence

of corruption insufficient because it related to systemic corruption within Pakistan
rather than judicial corruption specifically); id. at 1074 (speculating that a high-profile
case "is unlikely to get lost in the shuffle" of Pakistan's courts and thus would not be
subject to the documented delays of other cases); id. at 1075 (discounting the plaintiffs
fear of traveling to Pakistan despite U.S. State Department travel advisories).
250. See, e.g., Carijano v. Occidental Petrol. Corp., 643 F.3d 1216, 1226 (9th Cir. 2011) (voicing
concern about U.S. judges appearing to condemn the sufficiency of other countries'

legal systems); Niv v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 701 F. Supp. 2d 328, 337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)

(emphasizing that "[clourts must be cautious before finding incompetence or corruption by other nation's [sic] judicial systems" and collecting cases to the same effect);
Heiser, supra note 62, at 616 (noting the hesitancy of U.S. courts "to label the court
system of another country procedurally 'inadequate'); Rutledge, supra note 69, at 107879 (arguing that instead of "minimiz[ing] jurisdictional competition .... the adequacy
analysis simply worsens matters by miring courts in value-laden judgments about the
acceptability or unacceptability of a foreign forum").
251. See, e.g., Seguros Universales, S.A. v. Microsoft Corp., 32 F. Supp. 3d 1242, 1249-50 (S.D.
Fla. 2014); In re Air Crash near Peixoto de Azeveda, 574 F. Supp. 2d 272, 283-84 (E.D.N.Y.
2008); see also Davies, supranote 126, at 322 (noting that some courts base their adequacy
findings on their own consideration of publicly available material).
252. See Heiser, supra note 62,.at 616-17, 616 n.45 (collecting cases); Main, supra note 243, at

480.
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jurisdiction, service of process, and statutes of limitations, 253 all of which
defendants are quick to accept if it means the U.S. case will be dismissed. 254
These waivers and stipulations likely do more to reassure the court,
however, than to protect the plaintiff, who will be hard pressed to enforce
them once the case is out of U.S. court. 255 For one thing, the foreign forum may
not accept them; statutes of limitations and other jurisdictional defects may
protect interests that are not defendants' to waive. 256 It is also unclear how such
conditions can be enforced without either stepping on the toes of the foreign
forum or imposing significant extra costs on plaintiffs. The use of antisuit
injunctions to try to control the conduct of defendants in the alternative forum
is considered the nuclear option in transnational litigation, as it is inherently
offensive to the foreign forum. 257 And what if the foreign court refuses to
accept a defendant's waiver of a jurisdictional defect and enters judgment for
the defendant? As Thomas Main points out, if the plaintiff brings the case back
to a U.S. court, that court may then be forced to choose between the
recognition of a presumptively valid foreign judgment and the prior
conditional dismissal of another U.S. court. 258 Courts have tried to ameliorate
these problems by either dismissing cases without prejudice or by staying them
so that plaintiffs can return if problems arise, 259 but finding reassurance in
such "return jurisdiction" clauses relies on a herculean conception of plaintiffs'
patience, litigiousness, and financial resources. 260
Then there is Piper's distinction between foreign and domestic plaintiffs.
That gloss does not aid comity interests, as it is widely perceived as
discriminatory against foreigners. 26 ' The distinction has also proven
253. See Davies, supra note 126, at 316; Heiser, supra note 62, at 614-15, 615 nn.36-37
(collecting cases and commentary); Main, supra note 243, at 480 & nn.22-23 (collecting
cases).
254. Heiser, supra note 1, at 1171. And these are just the tip of the iceberg: Thomas Main has
identified fifteen additional categories of conditions that courts have attached to
dismissals for forum non conveniens. See Main, supra note 243, at 480-84.
255. See Main, supra note 243, at 479.
256. See id.
257. See Dodge, supra note 22, at 2114.
258. See Main, supra note 243, at 479 (identifying this possibility).
259. As Main points out, stays can raise their own set of problems, in particular the
appealability of a nonfinal order. Id.
260. See Davies, supranote 126, at 318-19.
261. Christopher Whytock's empirical study of forum non conveniens dismissals suggests
that "the Piper distinction between U.S. and foreign plaintiffs, as applied by the U.S.
district courts, is not merely a proxy for convenience, but instead may discriminate
against foreign plaintiffs as such, thus raising significant questions about compliance
with equal-access provisions" in U.S. treaties. Whytock, supra note 17, at 527; id. at 52324, 524 tbl.6 (finding that foreign plaintiffs' claims are dismissed for forum non
footnote continued on next page
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unworkably complex in application. Though the concept seems simple-U.S.
plaintiffs get more deference, foreign plaintiffs get less-that binary clarity
falls away on closer examination. What exactly does "less deference" or
"somewhat more deference" 262 mean, and what is the baseline from which
deference is measured? 263 Should courts similarly assume that a local defendant
264
And if so, what counts as a
is not inconvenienced by suit in its home forum?
265
Is a U.S. plaintiff doing significant business in a foreign
"local" defendant?
266
What about a
country really inconvenienced if forced to litigate there?
corporation that is only nominally incorporated in the United States but is in
all other respects foreign? 267 Or a U.S. plaintiff who initially brought suit in the

conveniens at a significantly higher rate regardless of the defendant's nationality); see
also Burbank, supra note 23, at 242, 246 (suggesting that forum non conveniens,
particularly the differential presumption, is perceived by other nations as discriminatory).
262. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 n.23 (1981) ("Citizens or residents deserve
somewhat more deference than foreign plaintiffs, but dismissal should not be automatically barred when a plaintiff has filed suit in his home forum." (emphasis added)).
263. For the Seventh Circuit, "less deference" means that "[w]hen application of the doctrine
would send the plaintiffs to their home court, the presumption in favor of giving
plaintiffs their choice of court is little more than a tie breaker." Abad v. Bayer Corp., 563

F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly
emphasized, in possible contrast, that "less deference is not the same thing as no
deference." Ravelo Monegro v. Rosa, 211 F.3d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 2000). The First Circuit,
meanwhile, has suggested that domestic plaintiffs no longer have an "automatic right to
the presumption" and should be denied its invocation if they are "acting with a
vexatious and oppressive motive." Interface Partners Intl Ltd. v. Hananel, 575 F.3d 97,
102 (1st Cir. 2009).
264. See, e.g., Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 161 F.3d 602, 609 (10th Cir. 1998) ("[A] forum
resident should have to make a stronger case than others for dismissal based on forum
non conveniens."); Reid-Walen v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390, 1395 (8th Cir. 1991) ("[W]here
the forum resident seeks dismissal, this fact should weigh strongly against dismissal.");
see also Galustian v. Peter, 591 F.3d 724, 732 (4th Cir. 2010) (raising the same observation). But see Pollux Holding Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 329 F.3d 64, 74 (2d Cir.
2003) (declining to give substantial deference to the plaintiffs' choice of the defendant's
home forum).
265. Compare DiFederico v. Marriott Intl, Inc., 714 F.3d 796, 800, 806 (4th Cir. 2013)
(emphasizing the local connections of the defendant when U.S. plaintiffs sued the local
franchisor of a separately incorporated foreign company), with Jiali Tang v. Synutra
Intl, Inc., 656 F.3d 242, 246, 252-53 (4th Cir. 2011) (discounting local connections when
foreign plaintiffs sued the local parent company of a foreign subsidiary).
266. See, e.g., Reid- Walen, 933 F.2d at 1395 (noting this issue in dicta); RIGroup LLC v.

Trefonisco Mgmt. Ltd., 949 F. Supp. 2d 546, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Dtex, LLC v. BBVA

Bancomer, SA, 512 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1020 (S.D. Tex. 2007), affd per curiam, 508 F.3d 785

(5th Cir.).
267. See, e.g., U.S.O. Corp. v. Mizuho Holding Co., 547 F.3d 749, 750, 752 (7th Cir. 2008); see
also RIGroup, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 553 (refusing to defer to the plaintiffs' choice of forum
when the U.S. plaintiff was a shell company).
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foreign forum? 268 And in transnational cases with multiple parties, is one U.S.
plaintiff enough? Should courts count the number of foreign versus domestic
plaintiffs in deciding whether to invoke the lightened presumption, 269 or
should they instead assess the legitimacy of the U.S. plaintiffs interest in the
case? 270
The actual complexity of this determination has led courts to look beyond
the plaintiffs' nationalities to their subjective motivations. Most notably, the
Second Circuit has interpreted the differential presumption as a "sliding scale"
that reflects the plaintiffs' forum-shopping motives. 271 That turn to forumshopping motives does not resolve the complexity, however, but merely shifts
its source. Even though Gilbert and Piper framed forum non conveniens as a
check on plaintiffs'-side forum shopping, 272 forum shopping is not so easy to
evaluate. It is an inherent aspect of the adversarial process, as both plaintiffs
and defendants want cases heard in the forum most hospitable to their
interests.273 It may even serve beneficial purposes in the marketplace for
268. See, e.g., Indusoft, Inc. v. Taccolini, 560 F. App'x 245, 252 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam);
Hananel, 575 F.3d at 103.
269. See Carijano v. Occidental Petrol. Corp., 643 F.3d 1216, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting
further parsing of the presumption to account for the relative numbers of U.S. and
foreign plaintiffs).

270. See, e.g., Vivendi SA v. T-Mobile USA Inc., 586 F.3d 689, 694-95 (9th Cir. 2009) (giving a
U.S. coplaintiffs choice of forum less deference because its role in the case was the
result of "eleventh-hour efforts to strengthen connections with the United States").
271. Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[W]e give greater
deference to a plaintiffs forum choice to the extent that it was motivated by legitimate
reasons, including the plaintiffs convenience and the ability of a U.S. resident plaintiff
to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant, and diminishing deference to a plaintiffs
forum choice to the extent that it was motivated by tactical advantage." (emphasis
added)); see also Vivendi, 586 F.3d at 694-95 (invoking the plaintiffs illegitimate forumshopping motives in affirming a forum non conveniens dismissal); Hananel, 575 F.3d at
102-03, 102 n.9 (adopting the Second Circuit's sliding scale approach). As examples of
such illegitimate "tactical advantagels]," the Second Circuit noted those "resulting from
local laws that favor the plaintiffs case, the habitual generosity of juries in the United
States or in the forum district, the plaintiffs popularity or the defendant's unpopularity
in the region, or the inconvenience and expense to the defendant resulting from
litigation in that forum." Iragorri,274 F.3d at 72.
272. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 251-52 (1981) (fretting that U.S. courts
were "already extremely attractive to foreign plaintiffs" and that without a robust
forum non conveniens doctrine, "[t]he flow of litigation into the United States would
increase and further congest already crowded courts" (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947)); see also id. at 252 n.18 (listing reasons-presumably illegitimate-why foreign plaintiffs would prefer U.S. fora).
273. See Vivendi, 586 F.3d at 695 n.10 (recognizing that a "competent attorney, as part of his
ethical obligation to represent his client with reasonable diligence, is obligated to
consider various fora and to choose the best forum in which to file a client's complaint"
but affirming the district court's determination that the plaintiffs forum-shopping
motives were illegitimate in that case (citation omitted)). For more neutral accounts of
footnote continued on next page
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procedural innovations and administrative efficiency. 274 Further, to the extent
there is "good" or "bad" forum shopping, that line is hard to discern and likely
in the eye of the beholder. 275 And because both sides can forum shop, how is a
judge to weigh plaintiffs' "good" forum-shopping motives against defendants'
"good" forum-shopping motives or plaintiffs' "bad" forum-shopping motives
276
against defendants' "bad" forum-shopping motives?
The differential presumption is thus hard to apply, whether treated as a
binary determination or a sliding scale. It may also be distorting the traditional
presumption even in cases involving domestic plaintiffs. In such cases, judges
relying on prior opinions that turned on the weaker presumption may find
their analysis inflected with the ramifications of that weaker presumption
even as they continue to dutifully recite the stronger version. Thus, at times,
cases involving U.S. plaintiffs are dismissed even though the public and private
factors are in equipoise, or at least do not weigh strongly in the defendant's
favor.277 And as Gilbert's initial presumption-the primary bastion of plaintiff
interests in a forum non conveniens analysis-is weakened for U.S. and foreign
forum shopping, see, for example, Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A

Realistic Look at Selecting a Venue, 78 NEB. L. REv. 79, 80-82 (1999); Debra Lyn Bassett, The
Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REv. 333, 335-36 (2006); and Franco Ferrari, Forum Shopping. A
Plea for a Broad and Value-Neutral Definition (N.Y. Univ. Sch. Law Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-39, 2014).
274. See Pamela K. Bookman, The Unsung Virtues of Global Forum Shopping, 92 NoTRE DAME
L. REv. 579, 616-21 (2016) (collecting sources).
275. See id. at 590; Silberman, supra note 8, at 342 ("[Wjhat is 'tactical' and what is 'legitimate'

may be an almost impossible line to draw and may prove to be just another issue over
which to litigate."); cf Whytock, supra note 17, at 485, 526 (concluding that judges can
distinguish "between appropriate and inappropriate forum shopping" through forum
non conveniens but finding that "conservative and liberal judges may have different
conceptions of what constitutes inappropriate transnational forum shopping into U.S.

courts").
276. Perhaps the answer is that defendant motives simply do not matter. See Piper, 454 U.S.

at 252 n.19 ("We recognize, of course, that Piper and Hartzell may be engaged in reverse
forum-shopping. However, this possibility ordinarily should not enter into a trial

court's analysis of the private interests.").
277. This is not always the case; sometimes judges do apply a strong presumption in favor of

U.S. plaintiffs that overcomes strong arguments in defendants' favor. See, e.g., DiFederico v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 714 F.3d 796, 803-08 (4th Cir. 2013) (declining to dismiss U.S.
citizens' case regarding a terrorist bombing in Pakistan even though most of the
evidence was located in Pakistan and the bombing was of significant local concern in
Pakistan). The claim is instead that this strong presumption is no longer consistently
applied even when the plaintiff is a U.S. citizen residing in the local forum. See, e.g.,
Estate of Thomson v. Toyota Motor Corp. Worldwide, 545 F.3d 357, 365-67 (6th Cir.
2008) (declining to evaluate all of the factors before dismissing a case brought by local
plaintiffs); Lynch v. Hilton Worldwide, Inc., No. 11-1362 (JBS/AMD), 2011 WL
5240730, at "3 (D.NJ. Oct. 31, 2011) (treating local tort plaintiffs' choice of forum as
warranting less deference because the plaintiffs' accident occurred in London).
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plaintiffs alike, the Gilbert test becomes even more lopsided in favor of
defendants, particularly U.S. defendants.
In sum, the Supreme Court transplanted a domestic rubric to the transnational forum non conveniens context, and the poor fit of those transplanted
factors has made it difficult for district courts to adequately account for foreign
or systemic interests in their analyses. The resulting miscalibration is
heightened by Piper/s suggestion that a foreign plaintiffs choice of forum
merits little deference, while the safety valve meant to protect plaintiffs
exceeds the institutional capacity of the courts and has thus been simplified and
ossified out of existence.
C.

The Hague Service Convention

Compared to their application of the Evidence Convention and forum non
conveniens, the district courts' application of the Service Convention appears
more sensitive to foreign interests: district courts typically require strict
compliance with the Service Convention, a practice that protects the due
process interests of foreign defendants and the jurisdictional interests of other
nations. That pattern of adherence reflects the clear structure of the treaty, the
Supreme Court's affirmation of a strong presumption in favor of its
application, and the ready ascertainability of its exceptions. To the extent the
Federal Rules have introduced to this analysis a discretionary loophole that has
led some courts to fall prey to parochial pressures, the inquiry's clear and
codified structure has also enabled other courts to push back against this
creeping parochialism.
Although there are similarities in the design of the Evidence Convention
and the Service Convention, the differences in phrasing of their opening
provisions have led the Supreme Court to interpret the former as discretionary
but the latter as mandatory for cases that fall within its scope. 278 For cases that
fall within the scope of the Service Convention, service must be completed
through one of several clearly delineated channels. 279 First, plaintiffs can send a
request for service to the foreign state's Central Authority, which every state
278. Compare Socidte Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522,
529, 533-41 (1987) (holding that the Evidence Convention is nonmandatory), with

Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988) (holding that
the Service Convention is mandatory). The Court's interpretation of the Evidence
Convention as nonmandatory is entirely plausible but not inevitable. See, e.g., Bermann,
supra note 164, at 531-35; Borchers, supra note 71, at 81; Burbank, supra note 60, at 13234, 149.
279. There is no hierarchy among these different channels; each is equally preferred and
valid. PERMANENT BUREAU OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTL LAW,
PRACTICAL HANDBOOK ON THE OPERATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 15 NOVEMBER
1965 ON THE SERVICE ABROAD OF JUDICIAL AND EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS IN CIVIL OR
COMMERCIAL MATTERS 65 (3d ed. 2006).
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party must establish; the Central Authority must accept requests for service,
280
Second, the
oversee their execution, and provide certificates of service.
Service Convention identifies additional channels of service that are available
unless the foreign state affirmatively opts out of them, including service "by
postal channels," 281 service by judicial officials (like hussiers) or private process
283
Third, states may
servers, 282 and service by consular or diplomatic officers.
permit additional methods of service either unilaterally or through additional
agreements. 284 The Hague Conference maintains a website listing approved
channels of service for each member state. 285
While service must be completed through one of these channels when the
Service Convention applies, there are nonetheless several well-defined
exceptions to its scope. First, the Convention does not apply if the defendant's
physical address is unknown. 286 Second, the Convention does not control if
287
In
service can be completed without transmitting documents abroad.
280. Hague Service Convention, supra note 18, arts. 2-6. The only exception to a state party's
obligation to provide service through its Central Authority is if the state "deems that
compliance would infringe its sovereignty or security," a conclusion that may not rest
"solely on the ground that, under its internal law, it claims exclusive jurisdiction over
the subject-matter of the action or that its internal law would not permit the action
upon which the application is based." Id. art. 13.
281. Id. art. 10(a). There remains a circuit split over whether article 10(a) allows for service
by mail. Compare Nuovo Pignone, SpA v. Storman Asia M/V, 310 F.3d 374, 384 (5th Cir.
2002) (holding that article 10(a) does not allow service by mail), and Bankston v. Toyota
Motor Corp., 889 F.2d 172, 173-74 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding the same), with
Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 802-03 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that article 10(a) does
allow service by mail), and Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 838-41 (2d Cir. 1986)

(holding the same). The Supreme Court will shortly resolve this question. See Menon v.
Water Splash, Inc., 472 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. App. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 547 (2016).
For the present, this Article adopts the majority view (both domestically and internationally) that service by mail is affirmatively permitted by the Convention. See
PERMANENT BUREAU OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTL LAW, supra note

279, at 77 &n.275, 80 (noting that other countries appear to agree that service by mail is

282.
283.

284.
285.

permitted by article 10(a)); see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 14, Menon, No. 16254, (U.S. Aug. 25, 2016), 2016 WL 4537379 (noting that allowance of service by mail is
the majority view among federal courts of appeals). Even assuming that the Service
Convention approves service by mail as a matter of international law, however, it
must still be authorized under domestic law. See Brockmeyer, 383 F.3d at 803-04.
Hague Service Convention, supra note 18, art. 10(b)-(c).
Id. arts. 8-9. This channel is moot for U.S. purposes as the United States does not
typically permit its diplomatic officers to serve documents abroad. See 22 C.F.R. § 92.85
(2016).
See Hague Service Convention, supranote 18, arts. 11, 19.
See HCCH, Table Reflecting Applicability of Articles 8(2), 10(a)(b) and (c), 15(2) and 16(3)
of the Hague Service Convention (2015) [hereinafter Hague Service Convention Table],
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/6365f76b-22b3-4bac-82ea-395bf75b2254.pdf.

286. Hague Service Convention, supranote 18, art. 1.
287. See id.
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Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, the Supreme Court held that the
law of the forum determines whether service can be completed without
transmitting documents abroad, 288 a legal conclusion with which the
Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference seems to agree. 289 Thus, if the law
of the relevant U.S. state allows for substituted service on a foreign defendant's
local agent and if that service can be completed domestically, the Convention
does not apply.290 Finally, if the foreign state's Central Authority does not
respond to a valid request for service within six months, the local court may
move ahead with a default judgment.29 1
U.S. plaintiffs must also comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.292 At the time the Court decided Schlunk in 1987, Rule 4(i) provided
federal litigants with additional, more flexible methods of service when
attempting to serve a party located in a foreign country, but it did not mention
the Service Convention explicitly. 293 The 1993 amendments to Rule 4, by

explicitly mentioning the treaty, raised the treaty's profile while providing a
more detailed structure for analyzing foreign service. 294
In sum, we have a clearly structured treaty that is backed by a Supreme
Court mandate and incorporated into the Federal Rules. And federal courts are
consistently applying the Service Convention. In written decisions analyzing
motions to quash foreign service, dismiss for inadequate service abroad, or
request court approval for alternative service abroad under Rule 4(f)(3), judges
do one of three things: (1) they find the Convention satisfied on its own terms
(because the Central Authority has returned a certificate of service 295 or
because service was effected by mail or private process server to which the
foreign state had not objected under article 10296), (2) they find the Convention
288. 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988).
289. See PERMANENT BUREAU OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, supra

note 279, at 14-21. But see Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 708, 716 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment) (disagreeing with this conclusion and worrying that it would undermine the
reciprocity reflected in the treaty).
290. See Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 707 (majority opinion).
291. Hague Service Convention, supranote 18, art. 15.
292. See Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 803-04 (9th Cir. 2004); PERMANENT BUREAU OF
THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, supra note 279, at 71 (discussing the
legislative history of the Service Convention).
293. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4() advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
294. See id.
295. Courts are rightly reluctant to look behind these certificates of service. See, e.g., Lumber
Liquidators Leasing, LLC v. Sequoia Floorings, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-313, 2014 WL 272401,
at *6-7 (E.D. Va. Jan. 24, 2014); Greene v. Le Dorze, No. CA 3-96-CV-590-R, 1998 WL
158632, at Y2-3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 1998).

296. See, e.g., BBK Tobacco & Foods LLP v. Juicy eJuice, No. CV-13-00070-PHX-GMS, 2014
WL 1686842, at '3-4 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2014) (noting that Canada had not objected to use
footnote continued on next page
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inapplicable by its own terms (because the plaintiff has been unable to learn the
defendant's address 297 or because service can be completed locally under state
law298), or (3) they require the plaintiff to attempt service again through one of
299
Federal judges are thus routinely
the Convention's approved channels.
putting the interests of foreign defendants and foreign states (as embodied by a
multilateral treaty) before the convenience of U.S. plaintiffs and sometimes
300
themselves-a distinctly nonparochial outcome.
Why has this doctrine not succumbed to parochial pressures? Most
obviously, the Service Convention is framed in mandatory terms, and as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Schlunk, it sets a strong default
presumption that the Convention applies unless judges can identify a reason
why it would not. Further, unlike the Evidence Convention, the Service
Convention adds to what is already a fairly rule-based determination.
Although U.S. courts ultimately evaluate notice in terms of a constitutional
standard, the Federal Rules long ago simplified the evaluation by providing
formalized categories of constitutionally adequate service.
In addition, the potential reasons why the Service Convention may not be
applicable in a particular case are readily ascertainable. Plaintiffs seeking to
establish the sufficiency of service can rely on the certificate of service that the
foreign state's Central Authority is obliged to provide and that domestic courts
of a process server); Curcuruto v. Cheshire, 864 F. Supp. 1410, 1412-13 (S.D. Ga. 1994)
(noting that Canada had not objected to use of registered mail).

297. See, e.g., SEC v. China Ne. Petrol. Holdings, 27 F. Supp. 3d 379, 397-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(holding that a plaintiff must make a concerted effort to identify the defendant's

physical address); Compass Bank v. Katz, 287 F.R.D. 392, 395-97 (S.D. Tex. 2012)
(holding the same).

298. See, e.g., Humble v. Gill, No. 1-08CV-166-M, 2009 WL 1126004, at *1-2 (W.D. Ky.
Apr. 27,2009).
299. See, e.g., Chowaniec v. Heyl Truck Lines, No. 90 C 07034, 1991 WL 111156, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. June 17, 1991).
300. Again, there is a possible selection bias in the cases selected for written opinions. Judges
might be more likely to write opinions when they dismiss cases for inadequate service
because those decisions are immediately appealable. Cf Hoffman et al., supranote 158, at
703-05 (hypothesizing that judges write opinions out of fear of reversal on appeal).
They would thus favor written decisions when they require strict compliance with the
Service Convention and be more likely to resolve motions summarily when they
approve noncompliant service. The diversity of the cases' procedural postures and
outcomes offsets that concern, however. Some of these decisions affirm service because
the judge concluded that it complied with the Convention. See, e.g., Patty v. Toyota
Motor Corp., 777 F. Supp. 956, 958-59 (N.D. Ga. 1991). Others direct plaintiffs to
additional options under the Convention and give plaintiffs more time to pursue them.
See, e.g., Randolph v. Hendry, 50 F. Supp. 2d 572, 580 & n.7 (S.D. W. Va. 1999); Pennebaker v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 155 F.RD. 153, 158 (S.D. Miss. 1994). And many of
these decisions are not on motions to dismiss but rather on plaintiffs' requests for
approval of alternative methods of service under Rule 4(f)(3). See, e.g., Agha v. Jacobs,

No. C 07-1800 RS, 2008 WL 2051061, at "1 (N.D. Cal. May 13,2008).
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are obliged to accept as proof of service. 30 1 If a plaintiff instead opts for service
through one of the article 10 channels, such as by mail or private process
server, the judge can check the Hague Conference's website to determine
whether the foreign state has objected to such forms of service or attached any
conditions to them.302 Plaintiffs wishing to establish that the Convention does
not apply can provide evidence of their unsuccessful efforts to locate addresses
for foreign defendants or of extreme Central Authority delay.30 3 Federal judges
are also used to applying forum state law to assess the adequacy of substituted
service.304 Finally, if the judge concludes that the plaintiff must try again to
effect service in accordance with the Convention, the procedures the plaintiff
must pursue are clear-and not dissimilar to procedures used domestically.30 5
There is, however, a line of cases that do not require compliance with the
Service Convention even when it applies. These cases reflect the parochial
pressures in miniature. That these cases have not overtaken the doctrine as a
whole also indicates the potential value of strong initial presumptions with
enumerated exceptions in helping courts avoid unintended parochialism in the
aggregate.
The problem traces back to the 1993 amendments to Rule 4. Since that
amendment, Rule 4(f) has provided three options when an individual (or a
corporation 3 6) is to be served outside the United States:
Unless federal law provides otherwise, an individual ...
not within any judicial district of the United States:

may be served at a place

(1) by any internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague Convention on the
Service Abroad ofJudicial and Extrajudicial Documents;
301. See, e.g., Lumber Liquidators Leasing, LLC v. Sequoia Floorings, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-313,

2014 WL 272401, at *6-7 (E.D. Va. Jan. 24, 2014); Greene v. Le Dorze, No. CA 3-96-CV590-R, 1998 WL 158632, at "2-3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 1998).
302. See Hague Service Convention Table, supra note 285. For an example of a district court
referring to the Hague Conference's website for this purpose, see BBK Tobacco & Foods

LLP v. Juicy ejuice, No. CV-13-00070-PHX-GMS, 2014 WL 1686842, at '3 (D. Ariz.
Apr. 29, 2014).

303. See Harper v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-97, 2013 WL 2470751, at *3-4 (W.D. Ky.
June 7, 2013) (permitting alternative service under Rule 4(f)(3) based on the plaintiffs
evidence that the Hong Kong Central Authority had not acted on his request); Marlabs

Inc. v. Jakher, No. 07-cv-04074 (DMCXMF), 2010 WL 1644041, at * 1-3 (D.N.J. Apr. 22,
2010) (approving service on the defendant's U.S. counsel "[in an abundance of caution"
when the plaintiff demonstrated concerted efforts to locate and serve the defendant in
India yet the defendant denied having received service).
304. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(1).
305. Compare Hague Service Convention, supranote 18, arts. 5, 10, with FED. R CIv. P. 4(e).
306. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(2) (approving service on a corporation outside the United States
by any method listed under Rule 4(f) except for personal delivery under

Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(i)).
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(2) if there is no internationally agreed means, or if an international agreement allows but does not specify other means, by a method that is reasonably
calculated to give notice: [listing four options]; or
(3) by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the court
orders.307

While the new Rule 4(f)(1) increased awareness of the Service Convention,
the new Rule 4(f)(3) introduced a safety valve that the Ninth Circuit has
interpreted as a broad standard applicable in all cases. In Rio Properties,Inc. v. Rio
InternationalInterlink, a U.S. plaintiff had not been able to locate the Costa Rican
308
Because
defendant, which existed primarily online, in order to serve it.
Costa Rica is not a member of the Convention, Rule 4(f)(1) was not at issue.30
The defendant, even while evading service, argued that the plaintiff must
attempt each and every method of service described in Rule 4(f)(2) before
seeking permission to use alternative (and easier) methods under Rule 4(f)(3).310
In rejecting this argument, the court relied on the simple disjunctive
relationship of Rule 4(0's three options:
Rule 4(f)(3) is not subsumed within or in any way dominated by Rule 4(0's other
subsections; it stands independently, on equal footing. Moreover, no language in
Rule 4(f)(1) or 4(f)(2) indicates their primacy, and certainly Rule 4(f)(3) includes no
qualifiers or limitations which indicate its availability only after attempting
311
service of process by other means.

In the context of Rule 4(f)(2), Rio's reasoning seems correct, or at least
unobjectionable. 3 12 But some district courts have since relied on Rio to
conclude that, even when the Service Convention does apply, plaintiffs can
immediately invoke Rule 4(f)(3) to seek approval to serve foreign defendants
through less formal means, like e-mail or Facebook. 313
That extension of Rids dicta is wrong under Rule 4 and violates the Service
Convention. The Advisory Committee's notes to Rule 4(0 make clear that
307. Id. 4(f).
284 F.3d 1007,1012-13 (9th Cir. 2002).
See id. at 1015 n.4.
Id. at 1014-16.
Id. at 1015.
Because Rule 4(f)(2) sets out four different options for service, some of them broad and
open ended, it would be inefficient-and most likely not the intention of the Advisory
Committee-to require plaintiffs to exhaust each option in every case.
313. See, e.g., WhosHere, Inc. v. Orun, No. 1:13-cv-00526-AJT-TRJ, 2014 WL 670817, at '1-3
(E.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2014); Feyko v. Yuhe Int'l, Inc., No. CV 11-05511 DDP (PJWx), 2013
WL 5142362, at "'1-2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2013); Knit with v. Knitting Fever, Inc., No. 084221, 2010 WL 4977944, at '3-5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2010); Studio A Entm't, Inc. v. Active
Distribs., Inc., No. 1-06CV2496, 2008 WL 162785, at `2-3 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 15, 2008);
Williams-Sonoma Inc. v. Friendfinder Inc., No. C 06-06572 JSW, 2007 WL 1140639, at
*1-2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2007).

308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
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Rule 4(0(3) was intended as a safety valve available only when the Convention,
by its own terms, does not apply.3 14 And even setting aside the explanatory
notes, Rule 4(f)(3) allows only for alternative methods of service that are "not
prohibited by international agreement." 3 15 As everyone agrees, the Convention
is mandatory when it applies. 316 Thus, unless the Convention does not apply
by its own terms, any method of service not approved by the Convention is
effectively prohibited under Rule 4(f)(3).
Courts invoking Rio's dicta have maneuvered around this limiting
language in Rule 4(f(3) in two ways, neither of which is satisfying. First, courts
assert that methods of service are only prohibited under the Service
Convention if they are explicitly proscribed.317 Thus, service by e-mail,
facsimile, or Facebook is not "prohibited" by international agreement because
these methods are not explicitly referenced in the Service Convention or in
any state's article 10 objections.3 18 This leads to the absurd result of a judge in a
single opinion denying permission to serve by mail where the foreign state has
314. For example, the notes suggest using Rule 4(0(3) when another country's Central
Authority refuses to "serve a complaint seeking punitive damages or to enforce the
antitrust laws of the United States," which would violate the other country's obligations under article 13 of the Convention. FED. R. Cv. P. 4(f) advisory committee's note
to 1993 amendment; see also Hague Service Convention, supra note 18, art. 13 ("[A state]
may not refuse to comply [with a request for service] solely on the ground that, under
its internal law, it claims exclusive jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action or
that its internal law would not permit the action upon which the application is based.").
More debatably, the Advisory Committee read a six-month good-faith time limit into
the Service Convention based on article 15, which allows a court to issue a default
judgment if at least six months have passed and the plaintiff, despite using a method of
service approved by the Convention, has not been able to obtain a certificate of service.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment (suggesting use of
Rule 4(f)(3) when another country's Central Authority has not effected service "within
the six-month period provided by the Convention"); see also Hague Service Convention, supra note 18, art. 15; Burbank, supra note 60, at 121, 137 (criticizing this interpretation of the Convention).

315. FED. R Civ. P. 4(f)(3).
316. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988);
PERMANENT BUREAU OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, supra
note 279, at xxv-xxvi.
317. See, e.g., Studio A Entm't, 2008 WL 162785, at '2-4; Williams-Sonoma, 2007 WL 1140639,
at *'2.
318. See FTC v. Pecon Software Ltd., No. 12 Civ. 7186(PAE), 2013 WL 4016272, at '4-5
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2013) (explaining that the court can authorize service by e-mail and
Facebook because neither is prohibited by any international agreement); Studio A
Entm't, 2008 WL 162785, at *4 (approving service by fax in Canada). Other judges have
applied similar reasoning-looking for explicit denunciation in the Service Convention or the foreign state's laws-in approving substituted service on local counsel or
agents. See Knit with, 2010 WL 4977944, at '5; In re LDK Solar Sec. Litig., No. C 07-05182

WHA, 2008 WL 2415186, at '2-4 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2008).
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objected to such service under article 10 of the Convention but approving (at
least in theory) service by e-mail because the foreign state has not explicitly
319
denounced such methods as well.

Second, courts have pointed to Schlunk to conclude that ad hoc substituted
service, such as service on local counsel, can be completed domestically and
thus does not violate the Service Convention. 320 This misreads both Schlunk
and Rule 4. Under Schlunk, the sufficiency of substituted service is determined
ex ante based on existing forum state law; 321 it is not an open-ended exception
to be defined by judges in individual cases. Only if state law affirmatively
allows for substituted service on local agents does Schlunk except such service
from the Convention's coverage. 322 In that case, service is completed
domestically under Rule 4(e)(1). 323 Service under Rule 4(f), on the other hand,
324
If a
occurs "at a place not within any judicial district of the United States."
court reaches Rule 4(f)(3), then, Schlunk's exception for domestic substituted
service is inherently no longer relevant. 325 Nonetheless, judges have
occasionally approved forms of substituted service under Rule 4(f)(3) that
would not be sufficient under forum state law, and they have invoked Schlunk
326
to suggest that the Convention does not prohibit such service.
The reasoning in these cases is thus flawed, so why have these courts found
it appealing? The 1993 amendments to Rule 4(f) could be an example of an
increasingly complex rule pushing decisionmakers toward a simpler

319. See Fisher v. Petr Konchalovsky Found., No. 15-cv-9831(AJN), 2016 WL 1047394, at "12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2016); Williams-Sonoma, 2007 WL 1140639, at *1-2.
320. See, e.g., Vanleeuwen v. Keyuan Petrochemicals, Inc., No. CV 11-9495 PSG (JCGx), 2012
WL 5992134, at '3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012); Brown v. China Integrated Energy, Inc.,
285 F.R.D. 560, 563-65 (C.D. Cal. 2012); In re China Educ. All., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CV 109239 CAS (JCx), 2011 WL 6846214, at '2-3, 13 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2011); Richmond
Techs., Inc. v. Aumtech Bus. Sols., No. 11-CV-02460-LHK, 2011 WL 2607158, at "11-14

(N.D. Cal. July 1, 2011); FMAC Loan Receivables v. Dagra, 228 F.R.D. 531, 533-34 (E.D.
Va. 2005).
321. See 486 U.S. at 707.
322. See id. at 706-08.
323. Rule 4(e)(1) permits service within the United States by "following state law for serving
a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the
district court is located or where service is made," such as by serving a party's local
registered agent. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1).

324. Id. 4(f).
325. See, e.g., Drew Techs., Inc. v. Robert Bosch, L.L.C., No. 12-15622, 2013 WL 6797175, at
'2-3 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 2, 2013) (reasoning similarly).
326. See, e.g., Richmond Techs., Inc. v. Aumtech Bus. Sols., No. 11-CV-02460-LHK, 2011 WL
2607158, at '11-13, '13 n.7 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2011) (acknowledging substituted service
not based on forum state law).
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standard. 327 For courts in the Ninth Circuit, dicta from that higher court
provided persuasive cover for reducing a multistep decision to a more familiar
exercise of judicial discretion. That equitable impulse encourages miscalibration in these decisions: in some of these cases, for example, the court cannot but
sympathize with plaintiffs trying to track down foreign defendants whose
only known identity is a transitory online presence. 328 But by turning
immediately to Rule 4(f(3) to solve such problems, judges elevate concrete case
management concerns over the systemic comity interests embodied in the
Service Convention. That tilt becomes more exaggerated when judges
effectively shift the burden onto foreign defendants by asking them to prove a
negative: instead of requiring plaintiffs to point to the text of the treaty,
foreign law, or forum state law to identify why an exception to the
Convention is warranted, this approach requires the defendant to prove that
the foreign state does not allow a certain form of service. Finally, to avoid
judging the efficiency of other countries' Central Authorities, a difficult and
sensitive inquiry, some judges have fallen back on generalized assertions that
complying with the Convention is difficult, costly, time consuming, and
inherently futile, 329 relying at times on nothing more than the plaintiffs' bare
assertion 330 or ossified citations. 33 1
The news is not all bad, however. Despite these parochial pressures in
miniature, the clear structure and mandatory nature of the Service Convention
327. It is recognized that rules are often rounded at the edges as decisionmakers chafe at
their under- or overinclusiveness. See Schauer, supra note 106, at 804-05 (summarizing
the literature); Sullivan, supra note 12, at 63 & n.261. The reaction suggested here,
however, is not as much about the tension between rules and standards as about the
tension between complexity and simplicity. Cf Kaplow, supra note 12, at 590 (discussing tradeoffs between complexity and simplicity as distinct from tradeoffs between
rules and standards). Indeed, an intricate set of rules can produce less predictability in
outcome as compared to simple standards because the "multiplicity of technical rules
givels] [the decisionmaker] greater discretion in employing them and in choosing how
much emphasis to put on each one." Doron Teichman & Eyal Zamir, JudicialDecisionMaking: A Behavioral Perspective, in THE OxFoRD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL EcoNoMIcs
AND THE LAW 664, 687-88 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 2014) (describing

behavioral psychology studies).
328. See, e.g., Williams-Sonoma Inc. v. Friendfinder Inc., No. C 06-06572 JSW, 2007 WL
1140639, at '1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2007).
329. See, e.g., Vanleeuwen v. Keyuan Petrochemicals, Inc., No. CV 11-9495 PSG (JCGx), 2012
WL 5992134, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012); Knit with v. Knitting Fever, Inc., No. 08-

4221,2010 WL 4977944, at 15 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2010).
330. See, e.g., In re LDK Solar Sec. Litig., No. C 07-05182 WHA, 2008 WL 2415186, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. June 12, 2008) (accepting the plaintiffs' assertion that serving the remaining
defendants abroad would be difficult).

331. See, e.g., Feyko v. Yuhe Intl, Inc., No. CV 11-05511 DDP (PJWx), 2013 WL 5142362, at
*2-3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2013); In re GLG Life Tech Corp. Sec. Litig., 287 F.R.D. 262, 26667 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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have prevented those pressures from distorting the doctrine as a whole. The
line of cases misapplying Rule 4 is still limited. Although most district court
332
opinions will now acknowledge Rio's dicta, they do so only to distinguish it.
Most judges also require plaintiffs to do more than simply assert that service
333
through the Convention's channels would be too difficult. Though it would
be preferable for the courts of appeals to clarify the limits of Rids troublesome
dicta, Rids harm has been circumscribed. The ultimate lesson of the
Convention and Rule 4, then, may be the feasibility of maintaining a
discretionary safety valve that risks some over- or underinclusiveness, where
that fuzziness on the margins is cabined by the clear structure of the initial
inquiry.
D. Recognition of Judgments
Given the discussion so far, it should not be surprising that the recognition
of foreign judgments by U.S. courts has been so markedly nonparochial. Like
transnational service of process, the recognition of foreign judgments has been
framed in terms of a pro-comity default presumption with clearly enumerated
exceptions. 334 Dating back to the Supreme Court's 1895 decision in Hilton, U.S.
courts have presumptively recognized foreign judgments unless one of a
limited number of exceptions applies. Most of these exceptions are susceptible
to concrete evidence or objective legal proof, or they involve familiar legal
determinations. For example, under both the common law and the uniform
335
courts must refuse to recognize a foreign
acts that codify the common law,
332. See, e.g., Midmark Corp. v. Janak Healthcare Private Ltd., No. 3:14-cv-088, 2014 WL
1764704, at *3 (S.D. Ohio May 1, 2014); Virtual Point, Inc. v. Hedera AB, No. 13-CV-5690
YGR, 2014 WL 1729025, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2014); U.S. Aviation Underwriters,
Inc. v. Nabtesco Corp., No. C07-1221RSL, 2007 WL 3012612, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 11,

2007).
333. Courts are consistent in this requirement regardless of the country in which the
defendant is located. See, e.g., KG Marine, LLC v. Vicem Yat Sanayi ve Ticaret as, 24 F.
Supp. 3d 312, 314-15 (W.D.N.Y. 2014) (involving defendants in Turkey); Midmark, 2014
WL 1764704, at *2-3 (involving defendants in India); Virtual Point, 2014 WL 1729025, at
'2-3 (involving a defendant in Sweden); SEC v. China Ne. Petrol. Holdings, 27 F. Supp.
3d 379, 397-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (involving defendants in China); Compass Bank v. Katz,

287 F.R.D. 392, 395-96 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (involving defendants in Mexico); Agha v.
Jacobs, No. C 07-1800 RS, 2008 WL 2051061, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2008) (involving

defendants in Germany); U.S. Aviation Underwriters, 2007 WL 3012612, at *1-2
(involving a defendant in Japan).
334. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1895); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).

335. Generally, in diversity cases, federal courts apply the state law of judgment
recognition. An exception is the SPEECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-223, 124 Stat. 2380 (2010)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4105 (2015)), which governs the enforcement
of foreign defamation judgments as a matter of national law. Most states have adopted
one of the uniform acts, both of which codify the common law test derived from Hilton.
footnote continued on next page
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judgment if the foreign court lacked personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, 336 an inquiry that courts evaluate using the same standards as they
would in domestic cases. 337 Courts may also refuse to recognize a foreign
judgment if the defendant did not receive adequate notice, if the judgment was
obtained by extrinsic fraud, or if the judgment conflicts with another final
judgment or a dispute resolution procedure to which the parties had agreed. 338
On these points, parties can produce, for example, proof of service or notice,
evidence of fraud, the contrary judgment, or their prior agreement.
There are a couple of exceptions that could be interpreted broadly,
allowing judges to review foreign judgments more aggressively if they wished.
First, courts do not recognize foreign judgments if the judicial system of the
foreign state is fundamentally unfair. 339 Second, courts may decline to
recognize foreign judgments when those judgments are "repugnant to the
public policy" of the forum. 34 0 Yet denials of enforcement are still rare under
both exceptions. 341
See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4 (UNIF. LAW
COMM'N 2005); UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT §§ 3-4 (UNIF. LAW
COMM'N 1962); see also Foreign-CountryMoney judgments Recognition Act, UNIFORM L.

COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Foreign-Country%20
Money%20Judgments%2ORecognition%2OAct (last visited Apr. 4, 2017) (listing states
that have adopted the 2005 Act); Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, UNIFORM L.
COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspxtitle=Foreign%2Money%20
Judgments%20Recognition%2OAct (last visited Apr. 4, 2017) (listing states that have
adopted the 1962 Act).
336. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(2);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 482(1)(b).

337. See RONALD A. BRAND, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION GUIDE:
RECOGNITION
AND
ENFORCEMENT
OF
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
17-18
(2012),

http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/brandenforce.pdf/Sfile/brandenforce.pdf.
338. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c)(1)-(2), (4)-(5);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 482(2)(b)-(c), (e)-(f). On the distinction between extrinsic fraud, which deprives a
defendant of the opportunity to be heard, and intrinsic fraud, or irregularities in
proceedings that should be raised and resolved in the initial forum, see UNIF. FOREIGNCOUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4 cmt. 7.
339. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY
MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT
§ 4(b)(1);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 482(1)(a).

340. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY
MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT
§ 4(c)(3);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 482(2)(d).
341. On courts' unwillingness to reject foreign judgments based on the systemic unfairness
of foreign legal systems, see, for example, Stephan, supra note 8, at 94. For rare
examples of such rejection, see Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 137, 141-42
(2d Cir. 2000); and Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1410-13 (9th Cir. 1995). Cf
Osorio v. Dow Chem. Co., 635 F.3d 1277, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming the lower
footnote continued on next page
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Why have these exceptions not expanded in practice? Two possible,
perhaps complementary, explanations are worth considering. First, the
exceptions are phrased as high bars: the foreign judicial system must be
342
fundamentally unfair; the judgment must be repugnant to public policy.
Second, judges are sensitive to institutional capacity concerns implicated by
343
searching reviews of foreign judicial systems. This sensitivity could explain,
for example, why judges have downplayed the evaluation of foreign judicial
systems as a whole. Indeed, that particular exception has morphed in practice
into inquiring whether the individual proceedings in question were fundamentally unfair. 344 Judges have thus swapped out a broad, difficult, and politically
sensitive factual question for one that is both narrower and more amenable to
concrete evidence obtainable by the parties.
Here again, as with the Service Convention, there is a strong default
presumption with ascertainable exceptions and a couple of discretionary safety
valves that are not easily invoked in every case. But what if complexity were
court's refusal to recognize a Nicaraguan judgment on three different grounds but
declining to address whether Nicaragua generally provides impartial tribunals).
On the rarity of invocation of the public policy exception, see, for example, BRAND,
supra note 337, at 21. See also, e.g., Naoko Ohno v. Yuko Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 1002-03,
1013 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasizing the rarity of the exception's invocation in concluding
that a Japanese judgment against a church was not repugnant to the First Amendment).
The public policy exception was invoked, for a time, by courts worried that enforcing
foreign defamation judgments would conflict with First Amendment protections, see
BRAND, supra note 337, at 21-22, but Congress has now codified this defamation
exception to foreign judgment recognition through the SPEECH Act, see 28 U.S.C.
§§ 4101-4105 (2015).
342. See, e.g., Heiser, supra note 62, at 640-41, 640 n.176, 653 & n.249 (collecting cases).
343. SeeJohn B. Bellinger, III & R. Reeves Anderson, Tort Tourisn The Casefor a FederalLaw
on ForeignJudgment Recognition, 54 VA.J. INT'L L. 501, 519 n.75 (2014) (collecting cases).
This institutional self-awareness could also explain the demise of the reciprocity
requirement for foreign judgments. Back in 1895, the Supreme Court held in Hilton that
the presumption in favor of enforcing foreign judgments is overcome when the
foreign jurisdiction would not have enforced a U.S. judgment in similar circumstances.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 210 (1895). The resulting reciprocity requirement
imposed a heavy burden on courts, which had to determine the nuances of foreign law
regarding judgment enforcement. See Coyle, supra note 30, at 1111-12. Further, refusing
to enforce a foreign judgment for lack of reciprocity elevated systemic concerns over
party fairness to a degree that proved difficult for courts to accept in practice. See id. at
1124 & n.53 (gathering scholarly criticisms of the reciprocity rule). The reciprocity
requirement dropped out of usage and was not included in the uniform acts, though it
has recently made a reappearance-amid much controversy-in a new model statute
proposed by the American Law Institute. See AM. LAW INST., RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE

§ 7(a) (2006); Coyle, supra note 30, at 1111-13 (discussing the controversy).
344. See Stephan, supra note 8, at 93-94. But see BRAND, supra note 337, at 13-14 (asserting that
courts have only refused to enforce judgments on this ground when the foreign system
as a whole is defective).
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increased in this context as it was with the 1993 amendments to Rule 4(f)-for
example, by the addition of more standard-based exceptions? We may soon
find out. The revised uniform act-published in 2005 and already adopted by
twenty states and the District of Columbia 34 5-has codified two additional
grounds for refusing to recognize foreign judgments: courts may decline to
recognize a foreign judgment if there is "substantial doubt about the integrity
of the rendering court" or if the "specific proceeding ... was not compatible
with the requirements of due process of law." 346 Note the vague phrasing of
these exceptions, which do not project a bar as high as the systemic unfairness
and public policy exceptions. What is "substantial doubt"? Whose standards of
"due process" should the court apply? Such vaguely worded additions may open
space for parochial pressures to grow. 347
V. Avoiding Parochial Procedure
The experience of the courts in handling questions of transnational
procedure suggests that further educating judges about the value and role of
international law can help-but will not by itself prevent the development of
parochial procedure. This Article has argued that parochial procedure may
instead be the result of institutional and cognitive constraints, amplified
through the path dependence of the common law. If so, correcting for judicial
parochialism requires structural, not just personal, solutions.
In particular, the foregoing discussion suggests three lessons regarding the
design of procedural inquiries. First, and not surprisingly, it is difficult for
courts to evaluate systemic interests on a case-by-case basis. A complex
consideration that is nonetheless fairly consistent across cases is a prototypical
example of when ex ante decisionmaking-that is, rules-will be most
efficient. 348 Thus, in the context of transnational litigation, a well-formulated
inquiry should begin with a strong presumption reflecting the balance of
comity and sovereign interests already struck by the political branches. This
presumption might be based, for example, on the default application of private
345. See Foreign-CountryMoney Judgments Recognition Act, supra note 335.
346. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECoGNrrIoN ACT § 4(c)(7)-(8) (UNIF.
LAW COMM'N 2005); see also id. § 4(c)(6) (allowing a court to deny recognition if it
believes that the foreign court should have dismissed the case for forum non conveniens). The new uniform act also expands the public policy exception to cover not only
causes of action but also judgments that are repugnant to the forum's public policy. See
id. § 4(c)(3); see alsoBellinger & Anderson, supranote 343, at 511.
347. Cf Whytock, supra note 28, at 116 (worrying "[tihis change invites US judges to more
closely scrutinise the specific foreign country court proceedings leading to a judgment"). But see Bellinger & Anderson, supranote 343, at 541 (defending these changes).
348. See Kaplow, supra note 12, at 573, 577.
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international law treaties even when they are not mandatory by their own
terms. 349 Or it might be based on an assumption about Congress's default
preferences, as was the Supreme Court's recent reinvigoration of the
350
Similarly, with forum non
presumption against extraterritoriality.
conveniens, courts might invoke a presumption in favor of exercising
congressionally granted jurisdiction instead of discounting a foreign plaintiffs
choice of forum.
Second, given the frequency with which these procedural questions arise,
simple rubrics (whether rules or standards) will reduce the risk of error.
Indeed, the story of parochial procedure may be more about the need for
351
A second
simplicity than about the tradeoffs between rules and standards.
stage of analysis might thus introduce limited additional considerations to sort
cases into a few common categories. Too many considerations in run-of-themill decisions can encourage the conscious or subconscious use of heuristics,
with less relevant or redundant factors overwhelming the test if they are
352
Some considerations-like
immediately pressing or easier to assess.
such factors will color
specified;
efficiency and judicial workload-need not be
judges' calculi whether or not they are explicit, and their enumeration may
lead to undue emphasis. Others, like the balancing of systemic interests, are best
accounted for in the framing of initial presumptions given the difficulty of
assessing them accurately on a case-by-case basis. In general, balancing tests
invite clutter, as considerations can be named without assigning relative
weight. 353 Self-sufficient exceptions to a presumption, on the other hand, have
349. See Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 556
(1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (proposing a default
presumption that the Evidence Convention should apply because the Convention
already "largely accommodated all three categories of interests relevant to a comity
analysis-foreign interests, domestic interests, and the interest in a well-functioning
international order"); see also Martinez, supra note 27, at 514 (identifying such an
approach as a "more antiparochial, system-protective practice").
350. See Rutledge, supra note 86, at 197-98; cf Goldsmith, supra note 36, at 1425-26
(discussing W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400 (1990),
as implementing a clear initial presumption under the act-of-state doctrine that
relegates "fine-grained" inquiry to "exceptional case[s]").
351. See Kaplow, supra note 12, at 589-90 (discussing the choice between complexity and
simplicity as a separate consideration from the choice between rules and standards).
352. Cf Beebe, supra note 10, at 1645-46 (observing that "multifactor tests of ten or even
eight factors appear to ask too much of the judge's ability simultaneously to weigh
competing concerns" and recommending that tests be limited to three or four factors).
For additional legal scholars drawing this connection from the behavioral psychology
literature, see, for example, VERMEULE, supra note 89, at 5; and Schauer, supranote 106,
at 811-12.
353. Cf Bone, supra note 98, at 2016 (critiquing multifactor tests for, among other things,
lacking clear principles to guide the normative task of comparing values).
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built-in weight (they overcome the presumption), which may beneficially
constrain their enumeration.
Third, if the key pivot point in the development of parochial procedure is
the pull of case-specific facts, then decisionmaking structures should help
ensure that difficult cases do not distort run-of-the-mill doctrine. 354 Thus, for
example, if a discretionary safety valve is needed for unusual cases, the
invocation of that safety valve should be set as a high bar to help flag those
cases as exceptional, signaling to later courts that they should be wary of
relying on them. Separately, the lack of meaningful appellate review can
compound parochial pressures by removing the most likely corrective
influence. 355 When issues are complex and systemic interests are at stake,
appellate review should be less deferential.
Taking these three points together, what we want is not a complex rule or
standard that tries to forecast all difficult cases but rather a simple rule that
sorts out the easy cases combined with a simple standard that can be invoked in
particularly difficult or unusual cases. 35 6 By avoiding open-ended discretion at
the outset, this sort of decisional ordering can protect against unruly
rulification, which can sabotage the very fairness gains sought from standards.
A loosening of the rubric at later stages of the analysis, however, after the bulk
of cases have been resolved, preserves discretion where it matters most: on the
margins where simple rules become over- or underinclusive. 357 Such
structured decisionmaking is not antithetical to the evaluation of international
comity.358 Indeed, one of the most traditional embodiments of comity in the
354. Cf Yair Listokin, Bounded Institutions, 124 YALE L.J. 336, 360-61 (2014) (arguing that
when unbiased agents are nonetheless prone to systemic errors, principals should
prefer "bounded structures" for allocating resources).
355. See Friendly, supra note 85, at 748-54 (critiquing Piper for compounding the
discretionary nature of forum non conveniens by subjecting it only to abuse of
discretion review).
356. This general structure echoes the conclusions of other scholars who have considered
the tradeoffs between discretion and institutional capacity. Cf Clermont, supra
note 248, at 229 ("Legislative rules should be the dominant motif. But there will
irresistibly be a residual role for judicial discretion, in adjusting the demands of the rare
case to the rigid rules."); Friendly, supra note 85, at 768-69 (advocating, in lieu of broad
discretion, a rule of preference with discretionary exceptions set as high bars).
357. Put another way, this structure restricts judges' initial intuitive responses, forcing
deliberative reasoning in order to invoke an exception. Cf Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking
on the Bench- How judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 29-42 (2007) (proposing that
trial judges be induced to deliberate in order to verify their intuitions, for example by
writing more opinions and using checklists).
358. See Socidt6 Nationale Industrielle Mrospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 554-55
(1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that "[t]here
is ... nothing inherent in the comity principle that requires case-by-case analysis" and
gathering examples of general rules of comity employed for other common inquiries);
see also Bermann, supra note 164, at 536 (cataloging "strong presumptions" in comity
footnote continued on next page
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U.S. common law-the recognition of foreign judgments-has flourished for
more than a century in this rule-like form.
Finally, throughout the analysis, consideration should be given to the
manageability of the factual inquiries courts are asked to make. What can
judges accurately determine, and what can parties reliably establish? Piper
illustrates the pitfalls of invoking decisional ordering without thorough
consideration of the manageability of the resulting inquiry. Recall that the
Court instructed lower courts to consider, at the threshold of the forum non
conveniens inquiry in transnational cases, only whether the remedy available
359
But determining gross
in the alternative forum was grossly inadequate.
inadequacy still requires an inquiry into foreign law, which can then mire
courts in complex evaluations. 360 In contrast, the factual inquiries involved in
361
To
the application of the Service Convention are much more manageable.
burdens
capacity,
judicial
strain
but
necessary
are
inquiries
certain
the extent
of proof (or standards of review) can be used to resolve uncertainty in favor of
system-enhancing outcomes.
This leaves the question who will design these better-structured rubrics
for trial judges to apply. Codification is the most obvious choice, and there are
many potential authors: nations via the negotiation of treaties, Congress or
state legislatures via statutes, uniform law commissions and the American Law
Institute via clarification of the common law, or the Advisory Committee via
revision of the Federal Rules. 362 There are lessons here, too, for the Supreme
Court: both for sensitivity to the constraints lower courts face in attempting to
balance comity and case-specific interests on a case-by-case basis and for the
need to intervene more than once every thirty years to correct the course of
doctrinal developments that have international implications. There is the
possibility, too, that the parochialism of individual Justices, rather than that of
individual judges, still matters given the Court's ability to shape procedural
doctrine. To the extent reformers wish to focus on judicial education, then,
those efforts are best directed toward the median Justices on the Supreme
363
Court who will cast the deciding votes in these transnational cases.
doctrines meant "to promote a cooperative international regime"). Indeed, as William
Dodge has recently concluded, the Aerospatiale test and forum non conveniens are
among the few doctrines involving international comity considerations that are
framed as standards rather than as rules. See Dodge, supranote 22, at 2082 & n.56, 2130.
359. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 251, 254 & n.22 (1981).
360. See Davies, supra note 126, at 321-22.
361. See supra Part IV.C.
362. Cf Coyle, supra note 1, at 436-37, 436 n.19 (arguing for greater incorporation of
international law into the U.S. Code).
363. It is notable that the Court's transnational cases have consistently been decided by close
votes. In addition to the split votes in A6rospatialeand Piper, for example, the Court's
footnote continued on next page
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In the meantime, district court judges can work intentionally to minimize
these pressures. Though the weight of accumulated practice can be heavy,
judges may be able to shift burdens of proof or persuasion, reconsider
unhelpful simplifications or ossifications of specific factors, and identify
honestly where they lack information to make accurate findings. In short, the
pressures explored here are not inevitable, and the structure of decisionmaking
can be refined or reformed through a number of institutional actors.
Conclusion
This Article took as a starting point a critique that runs through much of
the recent literature on transnational litigation. According to that critique, the
procedural practice of U.S. courts is undermining the long-term reciprocity of
private international law, which strains relations with allies, raises costs for
U.S. parties, and creates access-to-justice gaps. This parochial critique is
incomplete, however, to the extent it has not explored why U.S. procedure is
only sometimes parochial. I have proposed an alternative explanation for
parochial procedure: in the context of unfamiliar law, difficult facts, and
dynamic effects, judges as constrained decisionmakers will gravitate toward
rubrics that evolve to favor local interests while ossifying foreign factors. The
plausibility of this account was explored through four common doctrines of
procedure in transnational cases, and a framework of sequential decisionmaking was proposed to minimize the growth of parochial procedure. The goal,
both in theory and in prescription, is not to rule out the possibility of any
parochial decision but rather to ensure that doctrines and judicial practice in
the aggregate are not unintentionally tilted against the reciprocity on which
private international law depends.
While this Article has focused on the context of private international law,
the dynamics it explores and the decisional ordering it proposes may be equally
applicable to other complex and abstruse areas of law that involve difficult-toascertain general facts and broader systemic interests-for example, securities
law, 364 antitrust,3 6 5 patent

disputes,

bankruptcy appeals,

and complex

more recent opinions on the presumption against extraterritoriality have been
approved by narrow majorities. See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct.

2090, 2096 (2016) (4-3 decision); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662

(2013) (5-4 decision).

364. See generally Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 10 (offering a similar analysis of the use of
heuristics in securities law).
365. Cf Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The CommensurabilityMyth in Antitrust, 69 VAND. L. REv.
1, 44-55 (2016) (arguing that the development of Sherman Act section 1 analysis toward
strict threshold rules reflects judges' unwillingness to explicitly weigh incommensurate values, though not necessarily their institutional incapacity to do so).
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litigation.3 66 Meanwhile, this Article's more general insight-that U.S. judges
are not necessarily nationalistic, even if as a group they consistently reach
parochial outcomes-might help reorient the broader debate among
international law scholars about the sources and implications of American
exceptionalism. At least when it comes to the courts, the United States'
apparent insensitivity to other countries' interests or the value of multilateral
institutions may not reflect U.S. chauvinism so much as the structural
constraints of the U.S. judicial system. Those interested in promoting greater
U.S. engagement in international law may thus wish to focus on channeling
discretion in litigation to the cases that need it the most. In light of institutional
and behavioral constraints, the discretion of trial judges-and the interests such
discretion is meant to promote-may be best protected by obviating the need to
exercise it in every case.

366. See Bone, supra note 98 (discussing similar considerations in the context of procedural
rules, including those governing class actions); cf Wolff, supra note 26, at 1941-43
(disagreeing with Bone but recognizing both the need for a discretionary "safety valve"
and the risks inherent in "robust judicial discretion").
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